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I. Introduction
Our stratified society has long imbued race, gender, and class
with social and material meaning. 1 Perceived differences become
∗
Jacob Burns Foundation Professor of Clinical Law, George Washington
University Law School. Thanks to Esna Abdulamit for research assistance and
to the Washington & Lee Law Review for an enriching symposium on capital
punishment organized around the compelling case of Commonwealth v.
Giarratano. I extend my gratitude to the participants in the symposium for their
engagement with these weighty matters.
1. See generally CHRISTOPHER B. DOOB, SOCIAL INEQUALITY AND SOCIAL
STRATIFICATION IN U.S. SOCIETY (2013). Part 1 of Doob’s text develops in a global
context general concepts and theories of social stratification. Id. at 1–119. Part 2,
entitled Class, Race, and Gender, contains six chapters on class, poverty, racism,
and sexism. Id. at 120–346. The author’s aim is to “examine the processes that
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embedded in our social structures, enabling them to powerfully
influence our institutional operations while remaining largely in
the backdrop, often unnoticed and unspoken despite their profound
impact. 2 The American criminal justice system—especially its
death penalty systems—are premier examples of institutions that
operate in a manner deeply affected by structures of race, gender,
and class. 3
In some criminal and capital cases, the workings of race,
gender, and class are more evident than in others. If a poor
African-American man is charged with the rape and murder of a
wealthy white woman, race, gender, and class will not be
irrelevant characteristics in the popular understanding of the
crime and the processing of the criminal case. 4 If one or more of the
race, gender, and class characteristics of defendant and victim are
switched, the case will be viewed differently. 5 Consequently, many
people acknowledge the likelihood that beliefs about the meaning
of these categories, even those that are unconsciously held, can

have produced and sustained” inequalities in the U.S. between “select groups—
higher-class members, whites, and males” who “have had better opportunities
and, therefore, more extensive rewards” than have “lower-class people, racial and
ethnic minorities, and women.” Id. at 1.
2. See id. at 2 (defining social stratification as “a deeply embedded
hierarchy providing different groups varied rewards, resources, and privileges
and establishing social relationships that both determine and legitimate those
outcomes”).
3. See infra Parts II–III (analyzing how structures of subordination affect
criminal justice processes).
4. Justice William Brennan recognized this reality with respect to race in
his dissent in McCleskey v. Kemp. See 481 U.S. 279, 321 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (noting that a lawyer for a capital defendant, in particular a black
defendant charged with killing a white victim, would have to inform his/her client
that “there was a significant chance that race would play a prominent role in
determining if he lived or died”).
5. For this reason, Professor Cynthia Lee proposes that judges give
“race-switching” jury instructions in criminal cases that are especially susceptible
to racial stereotyping, asking jurors to switch the races of the defendants and the
victims in their minds to see if race-switching alters their conclusion. See Cynthia
Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness,
81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 482–85 (1996) (examining the operation, and the procedural
possibilities for amelioration, of racial stereotypes in jury decision-making). If it
does, this evidence of race bias encourages jurors to reconsider their initial
conclusion about the case at issue. Id. at 488–95. Presumably, Lee’s proposal can
be extended in appropriate cases to encompass gender and class issues as well.
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animate the handling of a criminal case and influence its
outcomes. 6
Giarratano v. Commonwealth 7 is not a case in which the
enduring features of race, gender, and class are readily understood
to be influential. 8 Nonetheless, if these categories operate
structurally in criminal cases, we should be able to excavate the
role that they play in Giarratano’s case or any other. In this essay,
I accept that challenge and seek to examine the interactive role of
race, gender, and class in capital cases in general and the
Giarratano case in particular. Through this effort, I hope to
cultivate a deeper understanding of the more hidden ways that
race, gender, and class can affect the death penalty system,
including the ways it can threaten the accuracy of fact-finding on
which the legitimacy of the capital sanction depends.
The reality that race, gender, and class structures affect the
operation of American death penalty systems represents a
profound concern about inequality and unfairness in the selection
of defendants for death. But it also represents an indictment of
American systems of capital punishment. According to the United
States Supreme Court, the death penalty—among the gravest acts
of government authority—can satisfy Eighth Amendment
6. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Our cases
reflect a realization of the myriad of opportunities for racial considerations to
influence criminal proceedings.”); see also Jenny E. Carroll, Images of Women and
Capital Sentencing Among Female Offenders: Exploring the Outer Limits of the
Eighth Amendment and Articulated Theories of Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1413,
1451 (1997) (“[T]he pervasiveness of gender expectations may well moot the
necessity that they ever be raised explicitly in order to influence the sentencer’s
decision.”); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 327, 322 (1987)
(“Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which racism has
played and still plays a dominant role . . . . We do not recognize the ways in which
our cultural experience has influenced our beliefs about race or the occasions on
which those beliefs affect our actions.”); Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism,
and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV. 581, 590
(1977) (arguing that sexism and racism are deeply embedded in our culture and
unconsciously affect behavior). Sociologist Christopher Doob provides evidence to
show that “among developed nations the United States has some of the highest
levels of social inequality” and that “systems of class, racial, and gender
stratification provide the conceptual foundations for analyzing trends in social
inequality.” DOOB, supra note 1, at 2.
7. 266 S.E.2d 94 (Va. 1980).
8. See id. at 103 (affirming the defendant’s death sentence for rape and
murder).
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prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment only when it is
administered non-arbitrarily and non-discriminatorily. 9 Under the
Court’s death penalty jurisprudence, a capital punishment system
must distinguish in a principled way between who is sentenced to
death and who is not. 10
Consequently, when race, gender, and class play an
explanatory role in decisions about who receives a death sentence,
under the Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence those
decisions constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. 11 The effect of this jurisprudential
command, in combination with other cultural influences, may be
to suppress official acknowledgment of the role that race, gender,
and class play in death penalty decision-making, even where their
work is obvious. 12 The upshot of acknowledging their role is to
9. These are the primary Eighth Amendment requirements that the
Supreme Court established in its per curiam opinion in Furman v. Georgia. See
408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (finding the death penalty as applied to be
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment). Although each Justice wrote
separately and no single opinion controlled, Justice Stewart’s opinion expressed
concerns echoed by other Justices in Furman and subsequent cases:
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that
being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. . . . [I]f any basis can be
discerned for the selection of these few to be sentenced to death, it is
the constitutionally impermissible basis of race . . . . [T]he Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of
death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so
wantonly and so freakishly imposed.
Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
10. According to Furman, the failure to establish a procedural system that
could rationally distinguish death-worthy and non-death-worthy cases rendered
the death penalty cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See
id. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[I]t is highly implausible that only the worst
criminals or the criminals who commit the worst crimes are selected for this
punishment. No one has yet suggested a rational basis that could differentiate in
those terms the few who die from the many who go to prison.”); id. at 313 (White,
J., concurring) (“[T]here is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases
in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”).
11. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 6, at 1451 (“[T]he use of gender-specific
traits as mitigators or aggravators during the sentencing phase of the trial runs
counter to the Furman goal of nonarbitrary application of the death penalty by
introducing constitutionally impermissible factors to the sentencer.”); see also
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 341 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“[E]vidence that race may play even a modest role in levying a death sentence
should be enough to characterize that sentence as ‘cruel and unusual.’”).
12. See Lawrence, supra note 6, at 322 (“[T]he human mind defends itself
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seriously undermine the legal structure of our death penalty
system and its claim to impartial and legally principled decisions
about who will be allowed to live and who will not. 13
Although this essay does not focus on doctrinal arguments
under the Eighth Amendment, it is important to note at the outset
that the arguments it develops about the entanglement of race,
gender, and class structures in capital decision-making processes,
including those that condemned Joseph Giarratano, have profound
Eighth Amendment implications. 14 These implications hang like a
shadow over America’s death penalty, representing reasons for
official reluctance to acknowledge what is readily apparent and
deeply important. In the process, the integrity of that system, one
that refuses to recognize the visible presence of what law requires
to be absent, is greatly diminished. 15
II. The Role of Race
I begin with two uncontroversial observations: The death
penalty has played a role of long standing in American culture 16
against the discomfort of guilt by denying or refusing to recognize those ideas,
wishes, and beliefs that conflict with what the individual has learned is good or
right.”).
13. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the majority’s fear of finding petitioner’s proof of race bias in death sentencing to
be sufficient is based on its admitted reluctance to “open the door to widespread
challenges to all aspects of criminal sentencing” and therefore suggests “a fear of
too much justice”).
14. See infra Parts II–III (analyzing race, gender, and class structures
embedded in the death penalty system).
15. In his dissent in McCleskey, Justice Brennan eloquently expresses this
concern:
It is tempting to pretend that minorities on death row share a fate in
no way connected to our own, that our treatment of them sounds no
echoes beyond the chambers in which they die. Such an illusion is
ultimately corrosive, for the reverberations of injustice are not so easily
confined.
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 344 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
16.
In the more than three centuries since the earliest recorded lawful
execution on these shores—1622, Daniel Frank, Colony of Virginia, for
the crime of theft—there have been an estimated 18,000 to 20,000
persons lawfully put to death. . . . Massive and familiar as its presence
has been in American society, the practice of capital punishment has
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and race has played a role of long standing in American culture. 17
Although these two starting points will not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that race and the death penalty are interconnected, the
reality is—as abundant evidence reveals—that they are powerfully
intertwined. 18 One cannot understand America’s penologies of
capital punishment—its legitimation of state-imposed death—
without understanding its ideologies of race, and vice versa. 19
Moreover, powerful ideologies of race interlock with other powerful
ideologies, such as those of gender and class, ideologies that,
reinforcing one another, create a complex hierarchy that separates
the classes of those who decide others’ fate from those whose fates
are decided. 20
A symposium based on the capital case of Joseph Giarratano,
a white man, is not the most likely occasion for examining these
questions about the entanglement of race and the death penalty.
Nonetheless, it is a valuable occasion for examining these
questions because, if the roles I ascribe to the ideologies and
hierarchies of America’s social strata in the capital punishment
undergone major developments in the past century. . . .
HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 3 (3d ed. 1982).
17. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS—THE COLONIAL PERIOD 391 (1978) (“[T]here is a nexus
between the brutal centuries of colonial slavery and the racial polarization and
anxieties of today.”).
18. See generally FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND THE
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2006)
(exploring the relationship between race and the death penalty).
19.
[O]ur book is an effort . . . to show the ways that the death penalty is
racialized, the places in the death penalty process where race makes a
difference, and the ways the very meanings of race in the United States
are constituted in and through our practices of capital punishment. . . .
[T]he death penalty is, and has always been . . . a tool . . . to oppress
racial minorities, and specifically, African-Americans.
Id. at 3. See also Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Looking Across the Empathic
Divide: Racialized Decision Making on the Capital Jury, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV.
573, 587 (2011) (“[R]acial animosity flourishes inside systems and structures of
domination, especially ones that have been constructed explicitly to deliver pain
or punishment on the basis of perceived wrongdoing. The processes of derogation
and demonization that characterize racial oppression have much in common with
the most punitive criminal justice practices . . . .”).
20. Sociologist Christopher Doob describes ideologies as “the complex of
values and beliefs that support a society’s social-stratification systems and their
distribution of wealth, income, and power.” DOOB, supra note 1, at 2.
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process are accurate, then evidence of their operation should
appear throughout a large volume of cases, not just in obvious
ones. Therefore, this essay explores how structural hierarchies
such as those built on ideas of racial difference are implicated in
cases like Giarratano’s.
A. History of Race Ideologies
Accepting the challenge to examine the role of racial hierarchy
in a case understood as non-racial requires attention to America’s
fraught and complex history of race. This history is grounded in
awareness that from the colonial era through the Civil War,
slavery constructed the meaning of race in America for more than
two centuries. 21 Slavery was the practice, white supremacy was
the ideology, and racial stereotypes were the consequence. 22
Slaveholders rationalized that Africans’ natural inferiorities to
white European colonists rendered them unsuited for liberty and
in need of the control provided by the institution of slavery, 23 an
institution with staggering economic benefits for the slaveholding
21. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 17, at 6 (“[T]he Constitution’s references
to justice, welfare, and liberty were mocked by the treatment meted out
daily . . . from the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries through the courts,
in legislative statutes, and in those provisions of the Constitution that sanctioned
[race-based] slavery . . . and allowed disparate treatment for those few blacks
legally ‘free.’”); KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE
ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH i (1956) (“American Negroes still await the full fruition of
their emancipation—still strive to break what remains of the caste barriers first
imposed upon them in slavery days.”).
22.
[D]eep faith in white supremacy not only justified an economic and
political system in which plantation owners acquired land and great
wealth through the brutality, torture, and coercion of other human
beings; it also endured, like most articles of faith, long after the
historical circumstances that gave rise to the religion passed away.
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 26 (2010).
23.
Faith in the idea that people of the African race were bestial, that
whites were inherently superior, and that slavery was, in fact, for
blacks’ own good, served to alleviate the white conscience and reconcile
the tension between slavery and the democratic ideals espoused by
whites in the so-called New World.
Id.
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classes. 24 Once the Civil War forced an end to slavery, a need arose
for other forms of control of the several million newly-freed,
racially-marked slaves 25 who, their former masters feared, might
revolt against them. 26
When federal efforts to support and protect former slaves
during the Reconstruction era were brought to a premature halt,
strictly enforced racial segregation policies and selectively
enforced law enforcement policies—the era known as Jim Crow—
emerged, providing white majorities with the control they felt they
needed. 27 Stereotypes of black people, especially black men, as
predatory, dangerous, and naturally inclined toward violence
served to justify these systematic policies of racial control. 28 Once
racial control policies were established, social conditions of
segregation and inequality maintained the ideologies of racial
24. See EDWARD E. BAPTIST, THE HALF HAS NEVER BEEN TOLD: SLAVERY AND
MAKING OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM xix (2014) (arguing that slavery was a
“rocket booster” for American economic growth, that it created “massive
quantities of wealth and treasure” and is implicated in the contemporary story of
America’s “success, power, and wealth”).
25. See, e.g., DAVID M. OSHINSKY, WORSE THAN SLAVERY: PARCHMAN FARM AND
THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE 83 (1996) (describing views of Southern
penologists at the turn of the century who asserted that Southern white society
needed strategies for dealing with their “large alien population, an inferior race”).
26. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 22, at 28 (“Rumors of a great
insurrection terrified whites, and blacks increasingly came to be viewed as
menacing and dangerous.”).
27. See id. at 30 (“Even among those most hostile to Reconstruction, few
would have predicted that racial segregation would soon evolve into a new racial
caste system as stunningly comprehensive and repressive as the one that came to
be known simply as Jim Crow.”); see also DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY
ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR
TO WORLD WAR II 42 (2008) (“[T]he intensity of southern whites’ need to
reestablish hegemony over blacks rivaled the most visceral patriotism of the
wartime Confederacy. White southerners initiated an extraordinary campaign of
defiance and subversion against the new biracial social order imposed on the
South . . . .”); Michael Fraser, Crime for Crime: Racism and the Death Penalty in
the American South, 10 SOC. SCI. J. 1, 1 (2011) (“With their system of absolute
control now gone, Southern whites were forced to utilize another tool to exercise
oppression: the criminal justice system.”).
28. See ALEXANDER, supra note 22, at 28 (“[T]he current stereotypes of black
men as aggressive, unruly predators can be traced to this period.”); see also PHILIP
DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE LYNCHING OF BLACK AMERICA 4–
5 (2002) (describing the “folk pornography” of daily Southern newspapers that
detailed lurid crimes by blacks to create a “[c]umulative impression . . . of a world
made precarious by Negroes”).
THE
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difference, at the same time that ideologies of racial difference
maintained segregated and unequal social conditions. 29 In short,
the past was not past—it flourished in new forms.
The rule of law, impartially administered, has long been
vulnerable to these race ideologies. In the same regions where
white-on-black racial violence, notably in the form of lynchings,
was virtually ignored by criminal justice processes, 30
black-on-white violence was punished with special fervor, most
notably with the death penalty. 31 This combination of
circumstances provides evidence that criminal justice actors were
using their authority strategically and selectively to reinforce
cultural norms of racial hierarchy, and assigning the death penalty
a key role in that racial narrative. 32
29. Convict leasing was a post-Civil War practice rooted in racial separation
and inequality and designed to reinforce the ideologies of black inferiority that
perpetuated the practice. See generally BLACKMON, supra note 27 (providing an
in-depth examination of convict leasing practices in various states). Blackmon
describes how for decades sheriffs in some Southern states used vagrancy laws to
take black men into custody and lease them into harsh labor conditions that
constituted slavery in all but name—“guilty of no crimes and entitled by law to
freedom, [they] were compelled to labor without compensation, were repeatedly
bought and sold, and were forced to do the bidding of white masters through the
regular application of extraordinary physical coercion.” Id. at 2–4.
30. See DRAY, supra note 28, at 457 (describing the participation and
complicity of law enforcement in lynchings of African-Americans, creating a
system in which “lynch mobs operated with complete impunity”).
31. Disproportionate use of the death penalty against African-Americans
convicted of violence against white victims was especially dramatic for
non-murder crimes. Until Coker v. Georgia prohibited the death penalty for rape,
in twelve southern states between 1945–1965, 110 of 119 defendants given death
sentences for rape convictions were black. See 433 U.S. 584, 584 (1977) (finding
the death penalty for rape to be unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment);
EVAN J. MANDERY, A WILD JUSTICE: THE DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 39 (2013) (citing findings from research of criminologist
Marvin Wolfgang). Dray observes that this pattern of capital punishment links to
post-Emancipation fears that sexual relationships between black men and white
women threatened white supremacy through interbreeding. See DRAY, supra note
28, at 60 (examining anxieties of Southern whites in the post-Emancipation
period). With or without evidence in support, allegations of sexual assault against
white women by black men were a common trigger for lynchings, especially
spectacle lynchings involving sexual mutilation. See id. at 82 (describing spectacle
lynchings accompanied by sexual mutilation). The frenzy unleashed by these
allegations is a form of projection, because the rape of black women by white men
was a central feature of the slave system. See id. at 70 (noting the widespread
practice of rape of black slave women by white male slaveowners).
32. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL
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These are the post-slavery realities that underlie the empirical
evidence presented to the Supreme Court in the 1980s in the case
of McCleskey v. Kemp. 33 That evidence, never refuted by the
Supreme Court, showed race, particularly the race of the victim, to
be a statistically significant factor in determining who received
death sentences. 34 When the Supreme Court upheld McCleskey’s
death sentence despite compelling evidence that race was playing
a major role in selecting who lived and who died at the hands of
the state, it effectively upheld the role of the death penalty in
supporting racial hierarchy and gave racial hierarchy a continuing
role in the state’s infliction of death. 35
McCleskey was a 5–4 opinion that was disavowed by its author
Justice Powell after his retirement. 36 So its conclusion, its
implications, and the ideas it embodies are sharply contested.
These are reminders—befitting a symposium in a Law Review
bearing the names of Washington and Lee—that in many ways the
ghosts of the colonial and antebellum slave system continue to
PUNISHMENT 97 (2003) (providing statistical support for the conclusion that
“lynching history predicts modern executions”).
33. See 481 U.S. 279, 313, 316–320 (1987) (holding that a study showing
statistically significant race-of-victim disparities in the imposition of the death
penalty did not prove discrimination in violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth
Amendments).
34. Using regression analyses in an effort to isolate the role that race may
have played in capital sentencing from the role that more than two hundred
legitimate factors may have played, Iowa law professor David Baldus and his
research team concluded that killing a white victim proved as significant an
explanatory factor in who received death sentences as having a prior murder
conviction. See DAVID BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR.,
EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 147
(1990) (analyzing the factors that contribute to an individual’s likelihood of
receiving a death sentence).
35. Writing for the majority in McCleskey, Justice Powell observed that
while there is “some risk of racial prejudice influencing a jury’s decision,” the
Baldus study did not demonstrate a constitutionally unacceptable risk of “racial
prejudice influencing capital sentencing decisions.” McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 308–
09. Edward Lazarus, a Supreme Court clerk from the McCleskey era, asserts that
Powell’s inability to uphold McCleskey’s claims was derived from Powell’s need to
believe in the “myth of southern progress,” the notion that “the South had
achieved a dramatic reformation on matters of race.” EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED
CHAMBERS: THE RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE OF THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 200
(1998).
36. See JOHN C, JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 451–52 (1994)
(describing Justice Powell’s reversal of views on McCleskey).
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inhabit our cultural contests. Since the late nineteenth century,
America has been at war with itself, deeply divided on whether and
how to challenge racial hierarchy and on the role law should play
in supporting or mitigating the racial hierarchy that became
embedded in American culture through its slave system. 37 As
recent events illustrate, questions about whether and how black
lives matter are still haunting us, as they have for centuries. 38 The
legal and ideological battles that undergird drug laws, stop and
frisk policies, police shootings, presidential campaigns, and most
certainly the death penalty, remain volatile and unresolved. 39
As coercive institutions empowered to keep people in bondage,
state criminal justice systems have long been key sites for these
ideological and legal battles. 40 The Fourteenth Amendment, part
37. See ALEXANDER, supra note 22, at 20–57 (describing how disruptions in
hierarchical racial structures of society—such as the abolition of slavery, demise
of Jim Crow, and the accomplishments of the civil rights movement—have led to
successful efforts to exploit racial resentments of poor and working-class whites
and to install new systems of racial control).
38. In 2012, after numerous publicized deaths of African-Americans by white
police and the widespread failure to hold police accountable, the
#BlackLivesMatter movement was formed. About the Black Lives Matter
Movement, BLACK LIVES MATTER, http://blacklivesmatter.com/about/ (last visited
June 7, 2016) (discussing the history of the organization) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). The mission of the movement is to broaden
“the conversation around state violence to include all of the ways in which Black
people are intentionally left powerless at the hands of the state. We are talking
about the ways in which Black lives are deprived of our basic human rights and
dignity.” Id.
39. See DRAY, supra note 28, at xi (“Is it possible for white America to really
understand blacks’ distrust of the legal system, their fears of racial profiling and
the police, without understanding how cheap a black life was for so long a time in
our nation’s history?”). Observers of American culture often note its distinctive
racial history and the way that history continues to pervade America’s social and
political structure. See PETER BALDWIN, THE NARCISSISM OF MINOR DIFFERENCES:
HOW AMERICA AND EUROPE ARE ALIKE 226 (2009) (claiming that the most
significant distinction between America and Europe “is not a grand opposition of
worldviews or ideologies . . . [i]t is the still unresolved legacy of slavery and its
tragic modern consequence of a . . . racially identifiable underclass”).
40. See ALEXANDER, supra note 22, at 13 (“Like Jim Crow (and slavery), mass
incarceration operates as a tightly networked system of laws, policies, customs,
and institutions that operate collectively to ensure the subordinate status of a
group defined largely by race.”); OSHINSKY, supra note 25, at 32–33 (describing
perception of white Southerners that post-Civil War law enforcement meant
“keeping the ex-slaves in line”); Fraser, supra note 27, at 1 (“With their system of
absolute control now gone, Southern whites were forced to utilize another tool to
exercise oppression: the criminal justice system.”).

1406

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395 (2016)

of the package of Reconstruction Amendments that followed soon
after the end of the Civil War, imposed the first explicit
constitutional limits on the power of states, because one outgrowth
of the Civil War was an awareness that tyranny could come not
just from a centralized federal power but also from decentralized
state authorities. 41 Questions of federalism— the appropriate
balance between federal and state power— continue to live in this
battleground, shaped by a cataclysmic conflict about the meaning
of race in America. 42
The story of Criminal Procedure—the constitutional
regulation of law enforcement processes and a course taught in
every law school—is one of the federalism stories that emerged
from the Civil War and carried forward its preoccupations with
race. 43 The Scottsboro cases, capital cases involving nine black
male teenage defendants falsely accused yet sentenced to death for
the rape of two white women, exposed the role of state criminal
justice and death penalty systems in perpetuating racial
stereotypes and racial subordination by state violence. 44 The
notoriety of criminal justice scandals like these provoked quests to
find federal mechanisms that might limit states’ racialized, and
sometimes lethal, abuses of criminal justice processes. 45

41. See GARRETT EPPS, AMERICAN EPIC: READING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 169
(“[T]he new nation that emerged from the Civil War could not exist as a
self-governing, democratic republic without strong federal monitoring of
individual rights.”).
42. See ALEXANDER, supra note 22, at 26 (“Federalism—the division of power
between the states and the federal government—was the device employed to
protect the institution of slavery and the political power of the slaveholding
states.”); id. at 25 (“The Southern slaveholding colonies would agree to form a
union only on the condition that the federal government would not be able to
interfere with the right to own slaves.”).
43. See LAZARUS, supra note 35, at 85 (describing the constitutional history
of Criminal Procedure as “forc[ing] state law enforcement officials to observe
federal constitutional standards” to combat notorious racialized abuses of state
criminal justice processes).
44. For gripping narratives of the Scottsboro case and the racial dynamics
that pervaded it, see generally DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE
AMERICAN SOUTH (1969); JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO (1994).
45. See LAZARUS, supra note 35, at 85 (“Scottsboro was a potent symbol of
what could go wrong locally in the American judicial system and a spur to both
those who would expunge bigotry from the system and those seeking to enforce
national standards of justice upon the states.”).

MATTERS OF STRATA

1407

Reconstruction’s Fourteenth Amendment was one of the
limiting mechanisms, a weapon in the fight to disentangle state
criminal justice and racial ideology. 46 Through its limits on state
power, the criminal justice protections contained in the federal Bill
of Rights were incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment
as limits on the actions of state authorities. 47 The Supreme Court
first applied the incorporation doctrine to reverse a state’s criminal
conviction in the Scottsboro cases, launching the broad
constitutionalization of Criminal Procedure. 48 Succinctly stated,
incorporation was a post-Reconstruction tool for reinforcing the
rule of law and curbing the worst racial abuses of state criminal
justice systems. 49 The expansion of federal habeas corpus remedies
was another approach to the same problem, providing greater
access to federal court review of state criminal justice actions. 50
The incorporation doctrine, the constitutionalization of
Criminal Procedure, and habeas corpus remedies are ostensibly
race-neutral legal mechanisms. Debates about their scope are often
devoid of explicitly racial content. 51 But all of these legal
mechanisms were born of America’s deep-seated racial conflicts.
When we recall their racial history, we can see more clearly the
46. See EPPS, supra note 41, at 166–69 (arguing that one of the meanings of
the Fourteenth Amendment, drafted to make sure that the newly freed slaves
obtained full rights of citizenship, was that “states must respect the same limits
as the federal government when they deal with any American citizen.”).
47. See id. at 169 (explaining that the post-Civil War need for federal
monitoring of state protection of individual rights led to courts finding individual
rights “incorporated” into the Fourteenth Amendment).
48. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) (reversing the Scottsboro
convictions by incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as binding on
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
49. See LAZARUS, supra note 35, at 85 (“The blood of the Scottsboro cases
courses through all these [Supreme Court] decisions [protecting the procedural
rights of criminal defendants].”).
50. See ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF
LIBERTY 1 (2001) (“Attempts to extend the range and efficacy of the writ
have . . . been inseparably connected for centuries with attempts to secure justice
for those who at any particular moment find themselves execrated by the
dominant forces in society.”).
51. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal
Procedure, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1543, 1554 (2011) (critiquing the Supreme Court’s
race-neutral discussion of Fourth Amendment doctrine and its avoidance of facts
identifying the race of the parties and relevant actors when deciding Criminal
Procedure cases).

1408

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395 (2016)

pervasive racial influences on the contours of our contemporary
criminal justice systems. And when we view these systems now,
we can begin to appreciate that they look the way they do because
of a significant cultural dynamic: longstanding racialized uses of
state criminal justice systems and fairly recent multifaceted efforts
to limit their racialized uses, followed by the pushback against
those limiting efforts that has gathered force in recent decades. 52
B. Understanding Race in the Giarratano Case
This brief description of the history of the many and varied
efforts to recapture state criminal justice systems from racialized
uses helps us to understand some of the ways that Joseph
Giarratano’s case was shaped by race. To one degree or another,
every criminal case has been shaped by race. Our criminal justice
system was forged in America’s racial cauldron and would not look
as it does but for our racial history. The constitutional arguments
that Giarratano framed in his jail cell, his access to the federal
courts to review Virginia court actions, the legal doctrines that
offered promise of relief but ultimately constrained his remedies,
are a product of the ongoing battle of ideologies that are, not
exclusively but in significant part, an inheritance of our racial past
and a continuing mold for our legal system’s future.
Moreover, Giarratano’s was a death penalty case, and as much
or more than any other practice, America’s capital punishment
system was forged in its racial cauldron. 53 When the end of slavery
removed the value of black lives as property, it enhanced the risk
52. See History of Racism and Immigration Timeline, RACIAL EQUITY TOOLS,
http://cw.routledge.com/textbooks/9780415892940/data/8%20history%
20and%20immigration%20timeline.pdf (depicting the history of racial equity in
America as including centuries of African-American oppression followed by a
relatively brief period of civil rights advances, then subsequent decades of
retrenchment).
53. See Bryan Stevenson, Close to Death: Reflections on Race and Capital
Punishment in America, in DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY: SHOULD AMERICA HAVE
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT? THE EXPERTS ON BOTH SIDES MAKE THEIR BEST CASE 93
(Hugo Bedau & Paul Cassell eds., 2004) (“[T]he struggles over capital punishment
in America have been fought from trenches that were dug in other, fateful
conflicts in the nation’s history—conflicts about slavery, about Southern culture,
about state and federal powers, about race relations . . . .”) (citing David Garland,
Judicial Lightning, THE TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT (Oct. 25, 2002)).
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of having black lives taken, as one author noted, by “white mobs
and white courts.” 54 Most lynching victims were AfricanAmerican, 55 such that lynching was understood as a practice of
racial violence staged publicly to bolster white supremacist
norms. 56 When Southern states turned away from lynching in the
twentieth century, whether due to fear of federal anti-lynching
legislation or otherwise, 57 we can find examples of officials calling
off would-be lynch mobs by implicitly promising capital
punishment as law’s alternative route to a parallel outcome. 58 A
recent empirical study by researcher Franklin Zimring reports
that, without exception, the states with the most extensive
lynching histories, including Virginia, now use the death penalty
and “collectively dominate the nation’s execution totals.” 59
Although Giarratano is white, Virginia’s attachment to the death
penalty that was imposed on him is part of a racial pattern, a
legacy rooted in its racial past.

54. OSHINSKY, supra note 25, at 29.
55. See ZIMRING, supra note 32, at 90 (analyzing data showing that “[t]he
victims of lynching were overwhelmingly African American”).
56. See DRAY, supra note 28, at xi (describing lynching as a system of terror
used to “maintain power whites had over blacks, a way to keep blacks fearful and
to forestall black progress and miscegenation” and “a constant source of
intimidation to all black Southerners young and old and a daily reminder of their
defenselessness”).
57. Some scholars suggest that in the early twentieth century fear of antilynching legislation led Southern states to turn away from lynching. See, e.g.,
MICHAL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL VIOLENCE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE POST-BROWN SOUTH 21 (1987) (discussing
potential causes for the decline of lynching).
58. The term “legal lynching” began to be used to refer to capital trials of
blacks for crimes against whites. See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 44, at 115
(“[O]fficials begged would-be-lynchers to ‘let the law take its course,’ thus tacitly
promising that there would be a quick trial and the death penalty.”); GOODMAN,
supra note 44, at 26 (describing, in a chapter entitled “Legal Lynching,” the view
that the hypocritical use of legal procedure to deny rights in the courtroom then
impose a death sentence resembled the practice of lynching, such that “the façade
of judge and jury would replace the rope . . . .”).
59. ZIMRING, supra note 32, at 96.
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1. Departure and Return of the Death Penalty

There is yet more evidence of the racial pedigree of the death
penalty in America. Furman v. Georgia, 60 the 1972 U.S. Supreme
Court case that temporarily halted America’s death penalty, was
brought to the Supreme Court by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund,
a legal organization founded by Thurgood Marshall and dedicated
to the advancement of civil rights and racial justice. 61 Those in the
contemporary movement to abolish the death penalty are known
as abolitionists, a racial justice echo that voices its link with the
abolitionist movement of the nineteenth century that sought to end
slavery. 62 As Evan Mandery writes in A Wild Justice, his book
about the Furman case, “everyone understood Furman to have
been about race.” 63 Four years later, when the Supreme Court
reinstated the death penalty in the 1976 case of Gregg v. Georgia, 64
it was clear that this retrenchment was tied to backlash against
the civil rights movement and the civil rights advances that it had
precipitated. 65 This backlash expressed itself in a racially charged
tough-on-crime movement. 66 But for the resentment of civil rights
60. See 408 U.S. 238, 229–30 (1972) (holding that state death penalty
statutes which allowed the arbitrary imposition of capital sentences constituted
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment).
61. See MANDERY, supra note 31, at 31–35 (describing how and why the Legal
Defense Fund put the death penalty on its litigation agenda).
62. See, e.g., Diann Rust-Tierney, We, Too, Are Abolitionists: Black History
Month, Slavery and the Death Penalty, HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/diann-rusttierney/we-too-are-abolitionists_b_168
386.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (exploring connections between the two
abolitionist movements and describing the death penalty as an “outdated legacy
of slavery”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
63. MANDERY, supra note 31, at 276; see also id. at 266 (“Why was the public
so angry with the Supreme Court about Furman? . . . The most significant context
is race.”).
64. See 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (finding state death penalty statutes
consistent with Eighth Amendment standards due to their procedures for guiding
jurors’ discretion in issuing death sentences).
65. See MANDERY, supra note 31, at 275–76 (asserting that “the public’s
antipathy” for the Supreme Court’s decisions on race and social issues was
“expressed in the campaign to revive capital punishment” because Furman’s
vulnerability—a 5–4 decision with nine separate opinions followed by personnel
changes on the Court—signaled that the campaign could succeed).
66. See ALEXANDER, supra note 22, at 40 (“Proponents of racial hierarchy
found they could install a new racial caste system without violating the law or the
new limits of acceptable political discourse, by demanding ‘law and order’ rather
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progress that led to restoration of capital punishment, the death
penalty would have been unavailable to the Virginia courts that
imposed it on Joe Giarratano in 1979. 67 Long after its abolition in
most Western democracies, the death penalty survived in America,
a relic of America’s centuries-old and still highly charged racial
dynamics. 68
2. Executive Clemency
Despite the death sentence that he received and the proximity
to execution that he experienced, the fact that Joe Giarratano no
longer lives under the official threat of death may have a racial
aspect as well. Based on a review of the facts of the case and
questions about guilt, Giarratano was granted a conditional
pardon and a commutation of sentence—from death to life with
parole—by Governor Douglas Wilder, who indicated that the
state’s attorney general should consider granting Giarratano a
retrial. 69 If a retrial were granted, its outcome would prevail over
than ‘segregation forever.’”); MANDERY, supra note 31, at 271–74 (describing
Nixon’s decision to manipulate racialized law and order rhetoric for partisan
reasons—appealing to the racial hostilities of white Southern voters).
67. See MANDERY, supra note 31, at 274 (“The justices [had been] agents of
unwanted social change, and through their decisions on busing and capital
punishment had sought to aid and protect a population that whites regarded as
dangerous and undesirable.”).
68. See DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN
AN AGE OF ABOLITION 11 (2010) (“What was once a familiar moral debate has been
reborn as a sociological and historical problem: how to explain the peculiarities of
America’s twenty-first century death penalty? . . . [America] continue[s] to use
capital punishment at a time when all other Western democracies have decisively
abandoned it.”); see also ZIMRING, supra note 32, at 5–6 (“Alone among the
Western democracies, state governments in the United States authorize and
conduct executions as criminal punishment . . . .”). Most of the executions in the
United States since 1976 have taken place in the South. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING
& GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA 31, 128–30
(1986) (reviewing America’s execution statistics and concluding that “[a]t first
sight, so striking is the contrast between the South and the other regions that the
South appears to be ‘another country’”).
69. See B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Virginia Governor Blocks an Execution, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 20, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/20/us/virginia-governorblocks-an-execution.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (reporting Wilder’s commutation
of Giarratano’s death sentence) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
John F. Harris, Wilder Grants Reversal of Death Sentence, WASH. POST (Feb. 20,
1991), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/02/20/wilder-grants-
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the sentence remaining from the conditional pardon. 70 Because the
prosecutor’s office with authority to provide a retrial never
permitted it and the Parole Board has yet to grant parole,
Giarratano remains incarcerated. 71
Although Governor Wilder expressed support for the death
penalty as Virginia governor 72 and refused clemency in other
cases, 73 it is not unthinkable that his perspective as the grandson
of slaves, the namesake of Frederick Douglass, and a child of
segregation, then the first African-American elected to statewide
office in Virginia and the first African-American governor in the
country, 74 influenced his willingness to entertain skepticism about
reversal-of-death-sentence/e26bf0dd-523b-4445-9e2e-b8726c6f03b5/ (last visited Oct.
4, 2016) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Pamela
Overstreet, Wilder Grants Conditional Pardon, UPI (Feb. 19, 1991),
http://www.upi.com/Archives/1991/02/19/Wilder-grants-conditionalpardon/53306669
39600/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
70. See Walter A. McFarlane, The Clemency Process in Virginia, 27 U. RICH.
L. REV. 241, 247 (1992) (describing the limits on the Governor’s authority that
required Giarratano’s conditional pardon to be structured as it was).
71. See John F. Harris, Terry Rules Out New Trial for Pardoned Killer:
Attorney General Certain of Giarratano’s Guilt, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 1991),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1991/02/21/terry-rules-out-newtrial-for-pardoned-killer/f123b9b6-5216-49a1-9602-b16581d555ce/ (last visited
Oct. 4, 2016) (examining Giarratano’s request for a new trial) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Although his life sentence renders him parole
eligible, the parole board has denied Giarratano’s previous requests for parole
based primarily on the seriousness of the underlying crime. See Joseph
Giarratano, Joe’s Blog #12—The Virginia Parole Board’s Decision, FREE JOE
GIARRATANO (Apr. 29, 2014), http://freejoeg.com/joes-blog-12-virginia-paroleboards-decision/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (stating the parole board’s reasons for
rejecting his parole requests) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
72. See L. DOUGLAS WILDER, SON OF VIRGINIA: A LIFE IN AMERICA’S POLITICAL
ARENA 134 (2015) (“I had campaigned [for governor] on a strong law-and-order
platform, including supporting the death penalty . . . .”).
73. See Harris, supra note 69 (stating that Governor Wilder “has refused
three other pleas for clemency from condemned murderers during his 13 months
in office”).
74. In his memoir, Wilder describes the effects of segregation on his life and
his political career, his involvement in civil rights activities, and his view that the
justice system was “stained by segregation.” Wilder, supra note 72, at 46–47.
Wilder was an admirer and associate of Spottswood Robinson, a high-profile
Virginia civil rights lawyer. Id. When Robinson became dean of the law school at
Howard University, Thurgood Marshall appointed Wilder to succeed Robinson as
a registered agent for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, enabling Wilder to meet
civil rights lawyers from all over the country and to be “involved in some of the
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the accuracy of Giarratano’s conviction, 75 despite political pressure
to allow his execution to proceed. 76 Growing up in a segregated
black community, educated in segregated schools and a historically
black college, attending Howard Law School where civil rights
litigation was invented by professors like Charles Hamilton
Houston and students like Thurgood Marshall—both of whom
pursued a legal campaign to dismantle segregation as lawyers at
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund—and having extensive
experience as a criminal trial lawyer, Wilder undoubtedly
encountered many stories of wrongful convictions and executions
of innocents, given the racialized context that made these
narratives especially prevalent among African-Americans. 77

great civil rights cases of the day.” Id.
75. See id. at 47 (describing his role in “representing those who were in
danger of being left outside the system of justice unless I helped them”).
76. Because Giarratano had numerous supporters, Wilder experienced
political pressure both to grant and to deny clemency to Giarratano. See Ayres,
supra note 69 (“Under intense pressure from both conservatives and liberals, Gov.
L. Douglas Wilder of Virginia decided today to spare the life of Joseph M.
Giarratano . . . .”). Typically, politicians in death penalty jurisdictions assess
their political risks as greater in granting clemency than in denying it. See, e.g.,
Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding
Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U.L. REV.
760, 774 (1995) (“[F]rom California to Texas to Florida, candidates for governor
sound as if they’re running to be executioner.”) (quoting Bob Minzesheimer,
Executioner’s Song Heard in Governor Races, USA TODAY, Oct. 27, 1994, at 9A).
Indeed, news reports implied that the decision of Virginia’s Attorney General to
refuse Giarratano a new trial was politically motivated. See Harris, supra note 69
(observing that Attorney General Terry was expected to run for Virginia governor
in 1993). The widespread perception that governors—such as Governor George
W. Bush of Texas—deny clemency based on a self-serving political calculus
explains an editorial cartoon that appeared in The Boston Globe in 2000, depicting
a Texas inmate being put to death by lethal injection as a Texas corrections
official explains to him: “Sorry—no reprieve . . . the Governor’s campaign needs a
shot in the arm.” Wasserman’s View, BOSTON GLOBE, June 23, 2000, at A24.
77. Governor Wilder describes the inequalities he experienced growing up in
racially segregated Virginia and expresses admiration for civil rights lawyers and
the movement to end segregation. See WILDER, supra note 72, at 40–47 (describing
the need for, and the role of lawyers in, efforts to dismantle segregation). Noting
that he had been a criminal trial lawyer for many years, id. at 134, Wilder
indicates that he saw himself making a contribution to civil rights “chiefly by
representing African American folks in the courts.” Id. at 45. He observes that
many of his cases “were not about race per se but race was often the underlying
issue.” Id. at 47.
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3. Juries

Where narratives like these have remained especially
prevalent among African-Americans in our still largely segregated
communities, the systematic exclusion of African-Americans from
juries has disproportionately excluded many whose backgrounds
have generated an openness to considering the possibility of official
error. 78 Through the combined operation of jury eligibility laws 79
78. See, e.g., Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We
Really Know About Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and
Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997, 1019–20 (2003) (reviewing social science
research suggesting that, relative to white jurors, black jurors are more skeptical
about “the fairness of the legal system” and that “many Blacks are socialized in
environments that are mistrustful of the egalitarian claims of White America”).
In the state of Virginia, a 2009 poll conducted by The Washington Post showed
that while seventy-two percent of white Virginians supported the death penalty,
fifty-six percent of African Americans living in Virginia opposed it. See Jennifer
Agiesta, On Eve of Execution, Virginians Broadly Support Death Penalty, WASH.
POST (Nov. 9, 2009), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/behind-the-numbers/
2009/11/on_eve_of_execution_ virginians.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (reporting
differential levels of death penalty support by race) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
79. Criminal defendants are constitutionally entitled to a jury drawn from a
pool representative of the community. See generally Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522, 537 (1975). However, because jury pools are commonly drawn from voter lists
and, for a variety of converging reasons, voter lists disproportionately exclude
African-Americans, jury pools typically underrepresent African-Americans. See
Cynthia A. Williams, Jury Source Representativeness and the Use of Voter
Registration Lists, 65 N.Y.U.L. REV. 590, 626 (1990) (describing the inaccuracy in
census and voter registration data that “results in the systematic
underrepresentation of distinctive groups of the community in jury pools”); see
also Stevenson, supra note 53, at 90 (“In several Alabama counties, over a quarter
of the African American population is illegally underrepresented on the list of
prospective jurors.”).
Of course, criminal justice policies that disproportionately convict and
incarcerate African-Americans, then attach voting disabilities to felony
convictions, will systematically reduce African-Americans’ eligibility for jury
service. See ALEXANDER, supra note 22, at 17 (“Like Jim Crow, mass
incarceration . . . authorizes discrimination against [large segments of the
African American community] in voting, employment, housing, education, public
benefits, and jury service.”). As Alexander observes, “Felon disenfranchisement
laws have been more effective in eliminating black voters in the age of mass
incarceration than they were during Jim Crow.” Id. at 187–88. She further notes
that “a large percentage of black men (about 30 percent) are automatically
excluded from jury service because they have been labeled felons.” Id. at 189; see
also Adam Liptak, Exclusion of Blacks from Juries Raises Renewed Scrutiny,
TIMES
(Aug.
16,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/17
N. Y.
/us/politics/exclusion-of-blacks-from-juries-raises-renewed-scrutiny.html?_r=0
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and jury selection practices—such as those that permit prosecutors
to peremptorily strike African-Americans from juries as long as, if
challenged later, they can articulate race-neutral reasons for the
strikes 80—in many communities juries rarely contain more than a
token number of African-Americans, if any. 81 Because jurors are
(last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (“Blacks may be less likely to be on jury lists that are
drawn from voter registration records, less likely to appear when called, more
likely to qualify for hardship exemptions and more likely to be disqualified for
felony convictions.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
80. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986) (shifting the burden to
the prosecutor to offer race-neutral explanations for peremptory challenges after
the defendant makes a prima facie showing of discrimination in the prosecutor’s
use of challenges). Batson has proven ineffective in preventing race-based
peremptory challenges to jurors. See Hilary Weddell, A Jury of Whose Peers?:
Eliminating Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection Procedures, 33 B.C.J.L. &
SOC. JUST. 453, 478 (2013) (“[P]eremptory challenges continue to be used
seemingly on race alone, and the current construction of the Batson challenge
does little to curb this use.”). This is so even after the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Foster v. Chatman. See 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1755 (2016) (holding
prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations to be pretextual only because of the
subsequent disclosure of his notes showing that he consciously struck all of the
eligible black jurors on the basis of race in the trial of a black Georgia teenager
for the murder of an elderly white woman). See Phyllis Goldfarb, Response, Foster
v. Chatman: E-Racing the White Jury’s Constitutional Veneer, GEO. WASH. L. REV.
ON DOCKET (May 29, 2016), http://www.gwlr.org/foster-v-chatman-e-racing-thewhite-jurys-constitutional-veneer-examining-what-lies-beneath/ (last visited Oct.
4, 2016) (observing that “were it not for the belated revelations in the prosecutor’s
notes, Foster’s Batson challenge would have continued to fall short”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
81. A recent study compiled the following evidence of the widespread
exclusion of African Americans from jury service:
From 2005 to 2009, in cases where the death penalty has been imposed,
prosecutors in Houston County, Alabama have used peremptory
strikes to remove 80% of the African Americans qualified for jury
service. As a result, half of these juries were all-white and the
remainder had only a single black member, despite the fact that
Houston County is 27% African-American.
In 2003, the Louisiana Crisis Assistance Center found that
prosecutors in Jefferson Parish felony cases strike African-American
prospective jurors at more than three times the rate that they strike
white prospective jurors. Louisiana allows convictions . . . even if only
10 of 12 jurors believe the defendant is guilty. The high rate of
exclusion means that in 80% of criminal trials, there is no effective
black representation on the jury because only the votes of white jurors
are necessary to convict, even though Jefferson Parish is 23% black.
In the years before and after Batson, Georgia prosecutors in the
Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit used 83% of their peremptory strikes
against African Americans, who make up 34% of the circuit’s
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not representative of the regions from which they are drawn, their
views may not be representative. 82 In capital cases, the process of
“death-qualifying” a jury—by removing all the jurors with
conscientious scruples about the death penalty83—will exacerbate
the problem, as the accumulated lessons of the lives of people of
color make them disproportionately disinclined toward death
sentences and thereby ineligible to sit as capital jurors, even in the
guilt-innocence phase of capital trials. 84
population.
EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A
CONTINUING LEGACY 14 (2010), http://eji.org/sites/default/files/illegal-racialdiscrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf [hereinafter EJI REPORT]. The EJI Report
recounts numerous stories of African-American citizens, descendants of slaves
and some of them survivors of Jim Crow, who have lived in a single county for
their entire lives and have never been called for jury duty, or who have been called
but struck from the jury for so-called race-neutral reasons that also applied to
whites permitted to serve as jurors. See id. at 16–35 (describing the impact of
race-based jury selection on the African-American community).
82. See Lynch & Haney, supra note 19, at 580 (examining studies that “have
found that race of the juror can matter in capital case outcomes”).
83. “Death qualification” refers to the practice of removing from a capital
jury, prior to trial, people who hold moral qualms about the death penalty. See
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (upholding the exclusion of jurors
removed for cause after expressing with less than “unmistakable clarity” concerns
about the death penalty that were deemed to prevent or substantially impair the
performance of their duties). The Wainwright standard for “death-qualifying” a
jury is broader than the original death qualification standard articulated in
Witherspoon v. Illinois. See 391 U.S. 510, 529–531 (1968) (reversing a death
sentence imposed by a jury from which people had been excluded after voir dire
for voicing conscientious scruples against infliction of the death penalty); see also
Craig Haney, Violence and the Capital Jury: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement
and the Impulse to Condemn to Death, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1463 (1997) (“Deathqualified juries are less likely to share the racial and status characteristics or the
common life experiences with capital defendants that would otherwise enable
them to bridge the vast differences in behavior the trial is designed to highlight.”).
84. A recent Gallup poll found that twenty-nine percent of white respondents
opposed the death penalty, compared to fifty-five percent opposition among black
respondents. See Andrew Dugan, Solid Majority Continue to Support Death
Penalty, GALLUP (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/186218/solidmajority-continue-support-death-penalty.aspx?g_source=solid%20 majority%20
continue%20to%20support%20death%20penalty&g_medium=search&g_campai
gn=tiles (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (comparing differential levels by race in support
for the death penalty) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also
Stephen P. Garvey, The Emotional Economy of Capital Sentencing, 75 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 26, 45–47 (2000) (reporting data showing that white jurors expressed more
anger toward defendants than black jurors did, regardless of the defendant’s race,
and that black jurors were better able than white jurors to empathize with both
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In other words, regardless of the race of the defendant, the
systematic and rampant exclusion of African-Americans from
juries skews fact-finding in the direction of more convictions and
death sentences. 85 These realities can influence other aspects of
the process. For example, even when there are legitimate defenses,
the possibility of actual innocence, or questions about the degree of
guilt, defendants understandably bent on escaping the possibility
of a death sentence may choose to plead guilty to obtain a sentence
less than death. 86 The pressure to do so will only increase where
the defendant’s sense of the jury is that selection processes have
skewed it toward a conviction and death sentence.
While issues surrounding jury composition play a role in an
overall analysis of the continuing pervasive effects of racial
dynamics on criminal justice processes, they do not play a role in
the Giarratano case. In what we now understand to be a decisionblack and white defendants and to “keep the sin separate from the sinner”); Adam
Liptak, Facing a Jury of (Some of) One’s Peers, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/20/weekinreview/20 LIPT.html (last visited
Oct. 4, 2016) (“‘There is a major bleaching of juries,’ said Samuel R. Gross, a law
professor at the University of Michigan. ‘Many more African-Americans are
excluded than whites. The biggest demographic predictor of attitudes toward the
death penalty is race.’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Lynch
& Haney, supra note 19, at 589 (“[R]acial animus is one of the most consistent
and robust predictors of support for the death penalty.”) (quoting James D.
Unnever, Francis T. Cullen & Cheryl Lero Jonson, Race, Racism and Support for
Capital Punishment, 37 CRIME & JUST. 45, 69 (2008)).
85. The death qualification of jurors prior to a capital trial removes jurors
who oppose the death penalty not just from the sentencing phase of the trial, but
from the guilt-innocence phase as well. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying
text (providing explanation of the “death qualification” process). Yet studies show
“a powerful correlation between attitudes toward the death penalty and
receptiveness to evidence of defendant’s guilt.” Liptak, supra note 84. See also
Richard Morin, Bias in the Jury Box?, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2004),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2004/03/21/bias-in-the-jurybox/c1bdc75a-879f-4a24-a21f-08a5c2d67387/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2016)
(describing research that shows death-qualified juries are more conviction-prone)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In Lockhart v. McCree, the
Supreme Court rejected a challenge to death qualification prior to trial that was
based on research showing that death-qualified juries were more convictionprone. See generally 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
86. See Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions are
Common in Capital Cases, 44 BUFFALO L. REV. 469, 488 (1996) (reporting a study
that showed sixteen homicide exonerees had pled guilty and that they explicitly
noted a fear of execution as the reason that they chose to plead guilty, despite
their innocence).
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making process motivated by a suicidal aim, Joe Giarratano
waived his right to a jury when he was tried for murder. 87 Aware
of gaps in his memory, addled by years of severe substance abuse,
and believing that he may have committed murder, Giarratano
thought he deserved to die. 88 Refusing to plead to eliminate the
prospect of the death penalty, Giarratano chose a bench trial to
fulfill his suicide mission. 89 With the help of his appointed defense
counsel, he waived a jury, presented an unsupported defense at
trial, obtained a conviction, and asked the judge for a death
sentence. 90 As events confirmed, Giarratano had correctly
identified the most efficient route to assisted suicide.
4. Judges
Of course, the judge had to play his expected role in the suicide
plan. Knowing that Giarratano had declined to accept a plea to
avoid the death penalty then waived his right to a jury trial, 91
knowing that Giarratano had suffered abuse in an unstable home
as a child and that he turned to drug and alcohol abuse starting at
age eleven, 92 knowing that Giarratano had attempted to take his
own life multiple times and was being administered psychotropic
drugs during trial, 93 the judge might have decided that, despite
Giarratano’s request for death, an appropriate sentence in these
circumstances was life in prison. 94 Although the judge was
87. See In re Joseph M. Giarratano, Petition for Conditional Pardon by the
Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia 3 (1991), http://freejoeg.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/11/07_S_Exhibits_Volume_SIX_of_SEVEN.pdf
[hereinafter 1991 Petition] (explaining Giarratano’s decision to waive his right to
a jury).
88. Id. at 2–9.
89. Id. at 2–3.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Testimony at the sentencing hearing provided the judge with this
information. See Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 266 S.E.2d 94, 100–102 (Va.
1980) (describing testimony at the sentencing hearing on Giarratano’s childhood).
93. Id.
94. In a companion case to Gregg v. Georgia, Woodson v. North Carolina
rejected the imposition of an automatic death sentence for a specified offense. See
Woodson, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976) (“[O]ne of the most significant developments
in our society’s treatment of capital punishment has been the rejection of the
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required under law to make an independent moral judgment as to
whether the circumstances of Giarratano’s life reduced his
culpability and made the death penalty excessive in his case,
Giarratano presumed that the judge would oblige his request to
receive a death sentence. 95 Why was this a safe wager?
The selection process for state trial court judges reinforced the
likelihood that the judge would deliver the death sentence that
Giarratano sought. 96 In states that have relied on the death
penalty to the greatest extent—states of the old Confederacy97—
judges are elected. 98 State judges typically serve for a term of
years, then stand for re-election against potential opponents, or
survive a retention election, to continue to serve. 99 In states where
common-law practice of inexorably imposing a death sentence upon every person
convicted of a specified offense.”).
95. See id. at 304 (“[I]n capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity
underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the character and
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense
as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of
death.”). In Giarratano’s case, the trial judge found that at the time of the offense
the defendant was not under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance and that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, or
to conform his conduct with the law, was not significantly impaired. See
Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 266 S.E.2d 94, 102–03 (Va. 1980) (analyzing
Giarratano’s mental state at the time of the offenses for which he was convicted).
Although these were factors expressly identified in the Virginia mitigation
statute, the statute also clarifies—consistent with constitutional requirements—
that mitigation cannot be limited to the identified factors. See VA. CODE § 19.2264.4 (2010) (outlining sentencing proceedings in Virginia).
96. Justice Stevens recognized this reality in his dissent in Harris v.
Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 521 (1995) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (“[G]iven the political
pressures they face, judges are far more likely than juries to impose the death
penalty. This has long been the case . . . .”).
97. As of April 7, 2016, 1167 of 1433 executions in the United States since
1976 have taken place in the South, more than eighty-one percent of all
executions in the post-Gregg era. Number of Executions by State and Region Since
1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo. org/numberexecutions-state-and-region-1976 (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
98. Virtually all states that have the death penalty, and all Southern states,
subject state judges to elections. See Bright & Keenan, supra note 76, at 776–80
(detailing judicial election procedures across the country).
99. Four-year and six-year judicial terms are most common in states that
require judges to face elections. See id. at 777–78 n.85–87 (listing state statutes
and constitutional provisions establishing judicial terms and elections). The
states that rely most on the death penalty are the states that select judges
through contested elections. Id. at 777 n.85. Judges often tout their death penalty
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the death penalty is popular, judges are under political pressure to
impose and support death sentences where they can. 100 Those who
fail to do so when opportunities arise are vulnerable to ugly reelection campaigns, and potential rejection, in the next election
cycle. 101
Political pressure to impose death sentences in states with
considerable support for the death penalty may remain acute in
Virginia, where trial court judges are elected by the Virginia
General Assembly rather than by the voting populace. 102 In this
unusual selection procedure, voting legislators may be concerned
about their own reelection to the Virginia state legislature and will
be inclined to make safe judicial choices that pose limited risk to
their reelection prospects. 103 Because judicial choices reflect

rulings during their electoral campaigns. See id. at 787 (“Incumbent judges have
used capital cases to advance their chances of reelection or retention.”).
100. See id. at 765 (“[T]hese political pressures have a significant impact on
the fairness and integrity of capital trials. When presiding over a highly
publicized capital case, a judge who declines to hand down a sentence of death, or
who [upholds] the Bill of Rights, may thereby sign his own political death
warrant.”). These political pressures can also influence the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion for elected district attorneys and for prosecutors who are
not elected themselves but who may aspire to become judges. See id. at 781 (“One
of the most frequently traveled routes to the state trial bench is through
prosecutors’ offices. A capital case provides a prosecutor with a particularly rich
opportunity for media exposure and name recognition that can later be helpful in
a judicial campaign.”).
101. In 1998, Judge Charles Baird of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
was the sole dissenter from the denial of an appeal by Karla Faye Tucker, the
first woman executed in Texas in the modern era. See Christy Hoppe, Board
Unanimously Rejects Tucker's Plea for Clemency: Federal Courts, Governor Could
Delay Execution, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Feb. 3, 1998) (reporting the legal
decisions that led to the execution of Karla Faye Tucker). Soon thereafter, Judge
Baird was ousted when he sought reelection. See Mark Hansen, Hanging Judges:
Going Against Prevailing Currents in Capital Cases Can Sink a Career, 85
A.B.A.J. 91 (1999) (“‘It was the worst thing I could have done for my political
campaign,’ Baird said of the dissent. ‘But it was the right thing to do in the face
of the law and due process.’”). For many other examples of judges made politically
vulnerable by decisions in death penalty cases, see generally Bright & Keenan,
supra note 98, at 761–65.
102. See VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7 (delineating procedures for judicial elections).
103. See, e.g., Bright & Keenan, supra note 98, at 789 (“[P]erceived ‘softness’
on crime or on the death penalty may have consequences not only for the judge,
but also for those who would nominate or vote to confirm the judge . . . .”).
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directly on these legislators, the safest path is to choose judges who
will reliably comport with the prevailing political will. 104
In states like Virginia, where in many of its regions the death
penalty has the backing of majorities, legislators have political
incentives to elect judges who will find favor with the general
electorate by demonstrating their willingness—sometimes even
their eagerness—to impose death sentences. 105 In a judicial
selection system like this, the pro-death penalty views of the
majority will control. 106 The anti-death penalty views that
predominate among minorities, who are disproportionately subject
to the harshest punishments, will have far more difficulty finding
their way to the bench. 107 These political dynamics were especially
pronounced in the late 1970s, an era of post-civil rights
104. See id. at 791–92 (“As a result of the increasing prominence of the death
penalty in judicial elections as well as other campaigns for public office, judges
are well aware of the consequences to their careers of unpopular decisions in
capital cases.”).
105. Although support for the death penalty has declined somewhat in recent
years, a majority of Americans still support it. See Shrinking Majority of
Americans Support the Death Penalty, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 28, 2014),
http://www.pewforum.org/2014/03/28/shrinking-majority-of-americans-supportdeath-penalty/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (noting that fifty-five percent of
Americans favor the death penalty for murder compared to thirty-seven percent
of Americans who oppose the practice) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Support for the death penalty also appears to be declining in Virginia,
although a sizeable majority of Virginians continue to favor it. A November 2009
poll by The Washington Post showed that two-thirds of Virginians still support
the death penalty. See Jennifer Agiesta, On Eve of Execution, Virginians Broadly
POST
(Nov.
9,
2009),
Support
Death
Penalty,
WASH.
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/behind-the-numbers/2009/11/on_eve_of_execution
_virginians.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (reporting that sixty-six percent of
Virginians favor the death penalty compared to thirty-one percent who are
opposed to the death penalty) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
106. Under the Virginia Constitution, all state appellate judges are elected by
the General Assembly as well. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7. The error-correction role of
the appellate bench can be compromised, especially on inflammatory issues such
as capital sentences for those convicted of high profile local murders, when
appellate judges share the political motivations and political vulnerability of trial
judges. See Bright & Keenan, supra note 98, at 785 (“A few rulings in highly
publicized cases may become more important to a judge’s survival on the bench
than qualifications, judicial temperament, management of the docket, or
commitment to the Constitution and the rule of law.”).
107. See Agiesta, supra note 105 (noting that a 2009 poll by The Washington
Post showed that while seventy-two percent of white Virginians supported the
death penalty, fifty-six percent of African Americans living in Virginia opposed
it).
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backlash. 108 Through political structures controlled by white
majorities, judges inclined toward issuing death sentences were
selected to preside over Virginia’s courts. 109 Racial dynamics
played a supporting role in sustaining the judicial selection system
that enhanced the likelihood that Giarratano would be condemned
to die.
5. Race of Victims
These are the less than obvious ways that race influenced Joe
Giarratano’s case. Yet the most obvious way that race played a role
in the Giarratano case is that he was convicted of killing white
victims. 110 In America, capital punishment has been reserved
primarily for those convicted of killing white people. 111 Indeed, the
Baldus study confirmed empirically what many had long
understood from observation and experience. 112 Baldus’
gargantuan study, conducted over years, demonstrated that
defendants convicted of killing white victims increased their
chances of receiving a death sentence by more than four times,
compared with those convicted of killing non-whites, a statistic
108. See MANDERY, supra note 31, at 275 (discussing how, in the 1970s,
“frustration with the Supreme Court was really born out of underlying resistance
to the Court’s position on race and social issues”). Giarratano was convicted in
1979, in the midst of this cultural battle. Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 266
S.E.2d 94, 95 (Va. 1980).
109. See Bright & Keenan, supra note 98, at 785 (examining the incentive
structure that leads judges to issue death sentences).
110. See David Baldus, George Woodworth, David Zuckerman, Neil Alan
Weiner & Barbara Broffitt, Symposium, Racial Discrimination and the Death
Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent
Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1657–58 (1998) (“[T]he
defendants in white-victim cases were more likely to receive a death sentence
than the defendants in black-victim cases. The strongest race-of-victim effects
were observed among the cases with average levels of defendant culpability.”).
111. After systematically reviewing more than two-dozen existing studies
concerning the influence of race on the death penalty, the General Accounting
Office reported that in eighty-two percent of the studies, defendants convicted of
murdering whites were more likely to receive death sentences than those
convicted of murdering blacks. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., DEATH PENALTY
SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5–6 (1990).
112. See Stevenson, supra note 79, at 97 (“The legacy of racial apartheid,
racial bias, and ethnic discrimination is unavoidably evident in the
administration of capital punishment in America.”).
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reinforcing a cultural message that the lives that matter most
should be avenged and that white lives matter most. 113 The Baldus
study provides empirical evidence that an ideology of white
supremacy, or ideas about racial difference, are at work in deciding
which capital defendants will be chosen for death. 114
III. Other Ideologies at Work
If this assessment of the way that race is implicated at least
to some degree in all capital cases, including the Giarratano case,
is sound, it follows that examining race alone will yield only a
partial analysis. Race never occurs alone, but always in
combination with other identity characteristics. For example, the
victims that Giarratano was convicted of killing were not just
white, they were white women. 115 This opens additional questions:
How does gender interact with race in the Giarratano case?
Answering this question first requires a backdrop understanding
of prevailing gender ideologies.
A. Gender Ideologies
Women have long been constructed as prototypical victims, a
class of people vulnerable to male aggression and therefore
dependent on the protection of other men. 116 These are key
113. See Baldus et al., supra note 34, at 143 (detailing the statistical impact
of the victim’s race on the likelihood of receiving a death sentence).
114. See Stevenson, supra note 79, at 99 (“The death penalty is dis-enabling
to a nation still struggling to overcome the legacy of slavery and racial apartheid
because it operates in a manner that reveals insidious race consciousness.”).
115. See 1991 Petition, supra note 87, Joint Appendix 2, Transcript of Hearing
before Thomas R. McNamara, May 22, 1979, at 17 (describing each of the female
victims, Michelle and Barbara Kline, as “Caucasian female”).
116. See CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATTERED WOMEN,
SELF-DEFENSE AND THE LAW 115–16 (1989) (describing differences in male and
female socialization such that a woman can spend decades “absorbing the
message that she is, and ought to be, gentle, weak and helpless; that she needs to
be protected from pain and injury; that she cannot really rely on her own strength
to save her”). This gender socialization may explain why researchers have
identified a “female victim effect” in which crimes with female victims are
punished more severely than crimes with male victims. See, e.g., Caisa Elizabeth
Royer et al., Victim Gender and the Death Penalty, 82 UMKC. L. REV. 429, 429–
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features of patriarchy, a structure in which gender determines who
acts and who is the recipient of others’ actions. 117 Patriarchal
cultures like ours often express chivalrous norms in circumstances
where protecting women from male aggression is deemed
appropriate. 118 While no longer articulated as the basis of official
policies, chivalry retains a surprising hold on popular
consciousness. 119 Even so, the generalization has significant
qualifiers.
For example, the more women diverge from classic female
stereotypes—deferential,
caretaking,
demure,
chaste,
33, 461–63 (2014) (reviewing several studies finding a correlation between female
victims and the likelihood that a death sentence will be pursued and imposed,
and concluding after additional research that “victim gender continues to
influence capital sentencing decisions”).
117. See Janet Rifkin, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, 3 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 83, 83 (1980) (“By patriarchy, I mean any kind of group organization
in which males hold dominant power and determine what part females shall and
shall not play . . . .”).
118. Originally understood as the gallantry expected of knights, the word
“chivalry” came to be used to mean “courtesy.” ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA,
http://www.britannica.com/topic/chivalry (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). More precisely, given its origin in the
behavioral code of the men who were knights, the word conveyed gendered
imagery, such that one of its definitions is: “an honorable and polite way of
behaving especially toward women.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/chivalry (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). The female counterpart of chivalry was “the
cult of true womanhood.” See Barbara Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood:
1820–1860, 18 AM. Q. 151, 151–52 (1966) (detailing the manipulation of women
into believing they should strive for piety, purity, submissiveness, and
domesticity within the home). Only women perceived as conforming to these
tenets of domesticity, submissiveness, piety, and purity were deemed worthy of
protection, such that they applied primarily to middle-class white women. See
PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON
RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA 5–8 (1984) (explaining race and class implications of
gender ideologies). In addition to these race and class effects, gender ideologies
reinforced the dominance and submission model of male-female relationships that
feminist theorists have decried. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 42 (1987) (“[I]f gender is an inequality
first, constructed as a socially relevant differentiation . . . then sex inequality
questions are questions of systematic dominance, of male supremacy. . . .”).
119. See, e.g., Michael Dowd, Dispelling the Myths About the “Battered
Woman’s Defense”: Towards a New Understanding, 19 FORDHAM. URB. L.J. 567,
575 (1991) (“[S]tereotypes of women as pure and passive, as caregivers and
nurturers, have been taught and accepted by men—and women—for centuries,
making the erosion of such beliefs a long and frustrating process.”).
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submissive—the less likely it is that they will be deemed worthy of
male protection. 120 Moreover, chivalry is a color-coded
phenomenon, in that some women of color, not as readily perceived
as conforming to female stereotypes, are not granted the same level
of protection. 121 To the extent that the criminal justice system
embodies dominant norms, created largely by those who organize
and operate it—disproportionately empowered white men—white
women are the standard beneficiaries of chivalrous responses. 122
Female murder victims, especially white female victims, can
evoke chivalrous impulses that enhance the likelihood that death
sentences will be imposed on those convicted of killing them. 123 In
120.
The ideology of gender has long suggested that to be a timid, delicate,
passive, demure, docile, deferential, and nurturing caretaker is to be a
woman worthy of the love and protection of men. . . . It is women’s
inability to live up to the ideal that disqualifies them from entitlement
to male protection . . . and contributes to women’s views that they are
to blame for violence against them.
Phyllis Goldfarb, Describing Without Circumscribing: Questioning the
Construction of Gender in the Discourse of Intimate Violence, 64 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 582, 608 (1996).
121. See, e.g., Sharon Angella Allard, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome:
A Black Feminist Perspective, 1 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 191, 198–99 (1991) (noting
that, “[t]hroughout history, Black women’s experiences with patriarchy differed
from those of white women” because Black women have been portrayed as
deviant, immoral, and not worthy of male protection).
122. See Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive
Feminism, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 21, 27 (1999) (“Men are men to the extent they
are not women: masculine, independent, invulnerable, tough, strong, aggressive,
powerful, commanding, in control, rational, and non-emotional. ‘Real women’
(that is, middle- or upper-middle-class white women) are dependent, vulnerable,
pliant, weak, supportive, nurturing, intuitive, emotional, and empathic.”). In the
criminal justice system, decisions are made—whether on the basis of the
gendered imagery of chivalry or otherwise—largely by white decision-makers.
See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 79, at 91 (“Although black people constitute 26
percent of the Alabama population, there are no African American appellate court
judges in the entire state, and fewer than 2 percent of the prosecutors and 4
percent of the criminal court judges are black.”). With the predominance of white
males in criminal justice decision-making positions, outcomes show marked
gender effects. See, e.g., Theodore R. Curry, The Conditional Effects of Victim and
Offender Ethnicity and Victim Gender on Sentences for Non-Capital Cases, 12
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 438 (2010) (reporting that white female homicides produced
longer sentences than homicides against men of all races).
123. See, e.g., Royer et al., supra note 116, at 431–32 (“Several studies have
found that the murder of a white female puts the offender at the greatest risk of
being sentenced to death.”). Although research has not proven that chivalrous
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the Giarratano case, the fact that the murder victims Barbara
“Toni” Kline and Michele Kline were white, mother and daughter,
one a teenager, may have tapped the kind of unconscious gender
imagery that increased the chances Giarratano would receive the
death sentence. 124 Rather than protecting them, he was found to
have grievously harmed them—the teenage daughter sexually
assaulted then strangled, her mother stabbed—an aggravated
crime only intensified by the violation of chivalrous gender
norms. 125
But chivalry has its limits. Because women are subject to more
violence from family members and intimates than from any other
source, one might think that protective impulses would have
focused the harshest punishments on the domestic violence
attitudes toward women explain these findings, Royer’s research team identified
an influential variable—perceptions of victim vulnerability—that may increase
the severity of punishment and correlate with gender. See id. at 436–37 (“[V]ictim
vulnerability is likely to be relevant in determining sentencing.”). To the extent
that perceived vulnerability on the basis of gender increases severity of
punishment, the chivalry thesis may be implicated. See also Stephen P. Garvey,
Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM.
L. REV. 1538, 1557 (1998) (reporting that in surveys of capital jurors, when the
victim was female, 21.3% of jurors found that fact aggravating).
124. See In re Joseph M. Giarratano, Jr., Petition for Conditional Pardon 3–5
(September 4, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 Petition] (describing the victims and their
murders). In fact, Giarratano received the death sentence after his conviction for
the rape-murder of Michelle, the teenage victim, whom the Virginia appellate
court referred to as a child. See Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 266 S.E.2d 94, 103
(Va. 1980). Through the use of the word “child,” the court may have been
conveying perceptions of victim vulnerability that make a defendant more
culpable and more deserving of death. Jurors have reported that killing a child
victim would make them significantly more likely to sentence a defendant to
death. See Scott E. Sundby, Symposium, The Capital Jury and Empathy: The
Problem of Worthy and Unworthy Victims, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 343, 346–47 (2003)
(“[M]ore than half of the jurors (53%) stat[ed] that a child victim would make
them ‘much more likely’ to send the defendant to the death chamber); Garvey,
supra note 123, at 1556 (reporting research showing that “a sizeable majority of
jurors would be more likely to impose death if the victim was a child”).
125. See Giarratano, 266 S.E.2d at 103 (finding the death penalty not
excessive or disproportionate for the murder of Michelle, in part because of the
horror she must have experienced as she was strangled); see also Elizabeth
Rapaport, The Death Penalty and Gender Discrimination, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
367, 370, 380 (1991) (observing that felony murders represent a significant
percentage of the murders that receive capital sentences and noting the extra
opprobrium with which our culture regards rape-murders); Royer et al., supra
note 116, at 461 (“[S]exual violence during the crime increased the likelihood that
the defendant would be sentenced to death.”).

MATTERS OF STRATA

1427

problem. 126 Yet, perversely, had the female victims been
Giarratano’s mother or wife or daughter, these relationships might
have been mitigating facts, reducing the likelihood that he would
receive a death sentence. 127
This punishment discount for the lethal violence men commit
against female intimates disappears when the genders are
reversed. 128 While the lethal violence that women commit against
male intimates is far less frequent, it is often punished more
severely. 129 Women are sentenced to death at higher rates than are
men for domestic violence murders. 130
This collection of seemingly inconsistent responses to similar
circumstances can be viewed as a problem of gender hierarchy.
Statistics suggest that domestic violence is a wide-ranging
126. See NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, Why Do Women Use
Force or Violence in Intimate Partner Relationships?, http://ncadv.org/
files/Why%20Women%20Use%20Force%20or%20Violence%20in%20Intimate%2
0Partner%20Relationships.pdf (“Women are five times more likely than men to
be victimized by a spouse or partner, ex-partner, boyfriend, or girlfriend.”); see
also Diane Craven, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. SPECIAL REP., Sex Differences in
Violence Victimization, 1994, at 4 (1997), http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/SDVV.PDF (reporting that sixty-two percent of all victimizations against
women were committed by people they knew).
127. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432–33 (1980) (“The petitioner’s
crimes cannot be said to have reflected a consciousness materially more ‘depraved’
than that of any person guilty of murder. His victims were killed instantaneously.
They were members of his family who were causing him extreme emotional
trauma.”); see also Rapaport, supra note 125, at 375 (“[M]urders of nonintimates
by men are twice as likely to lead to the death penalty as are murders of
intimates.”). Rapaport states that because domestic murders are more likely than
predatory murders to have women and children as victims, regarding predatory
murders as more heinous than domestic murders “privileges the interests of men
over those of women and children and supports patriarchal values.” Id. at 378.
Although Giarratano was acquainted with the two women he was convicted of
killing, it would be an exaggeration to regard his as a conviction for domestic
violence, because the evidence suggests he occasionally slept on the victims’ couch
but was not in intimate relationship with either.
128. See Rapaport, supra note 125, at 382 (“[A] strikingly high percentage of
the women on death row, unlike the men, killed family or intimates.”).
129. See id. at 367, 370–71 (presenting data showing that although “[t]he
victims of women killers are substantially more likely than those of men to be
family members and less likely to be strangers” and women commit a small
percentage of murders, “death-sentenced women are more likely than deathsentenced men to have killed intimates”).
130. See id. at 375–76 (“The high percentage of intimacy murders among
death-sentenced women may reflect differential treatment of male and female
murders of intimates . . . .”).
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problem. 131 In our current systems, the more common the problem,
the more it crosses social classes, the less deviant it is, and the less
appropriate the extreme sanction of the death penalty becomes. 132
As a result, male-on-female violence between intimates is
punished less severely not despite the fact that it is rampant, but
because it is.
By contrast, the limited prevalence of female-perpetrated
lethal violence between intimates makes it deviant behavior. 133
Additionally, although all of women’s violence defies gender
stereotypes, domestic crimes violate the stereotype of women as
family caregivers. 134 Behaving counter to stereotype can operate to
intensify punitive reactions to a crime. 135 This gendered pattern of
punishment perpetuates the patriarchal norms that bolster gender
hierarchy, as women remain disproportionately subject to men’s
violence, both private and public. 136
131. One in five women have been victims of severe physical violence by an
intimate partner in their lifetime. See Statistics, NAT’L COALITION AGAINST
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://www.ncadv.org/learn/statistics (last visited Oct. 4,
2016) (reporting statistics for intimate partner violence) (on file with Washington
and Lee Law Review).
132. See Rapaport, supra note 125, at 376–77 (asserting that, although the
death penalty is to be reserved for the most reprehensible murders, “[t]he worst
cases of domestic violence, unlike the worst cases of robbery violence, are not, as
such, eligible for capital adjudication”).
133. See id. at 369–71 (“[I]n the twelve years 1976–1987, women made up 14.3
percent of murder and non-negligent manslaughter suspects known to the police”
but “women who kill are more likely than men to kill family and other
intimates.”).
134. See Goldfarb, supra note 120, at 608 (including “nurturing caretaker” as
part of the ideological content of gender for women).
135. See, e.g., Victor L. Streib, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 845, 878–79 (1990) (observing
that women sentenced to death and executed were likely to be “poor, uneducated,
of the lowest social class in the community,” and to have “manifested an attitude
of violence”). Streib further notes that “[t]heir victims tended to be white and of
particularly protected classes, either children or socially prominent adults” and
that “perhaps most fatally for them, they committed shockingly ‘unladylike’
behavior allowing the sentencing judges and juries to put aside any image of them
as ‘the gentler sex.’” Id.; see also Carroll, supra note 6, at 1451–52 (noting the role
of violating gender expectations in death sentencing for women).
136. See Rapaport, supra note 125, at 379 (challenging the view that domestic
violence, “from which women and children suffer disproportionately, is less
reprehensible” than stranger violence). Rapaport suggests that “[t]he supposition
that predatory violence is more reprehensible than domestic violence is a
symptom or effect of the ancient family privacy doctrine that has supported male
domestic authority . . . at the price of tolerating . . . a culture of domestic

MATTERS OF STRATA

1429

Principles of human psychology support the status quo.
Because decision-making in the criminal justice system is likely to
serve the felt interests of those who organize and operate it—
again, disproportionately white men—these decision-makers may
identify in some respects with men who contribute to the
widespread problem of domestic violence crimes against female
intimates. 137 Identification may contribute to a reluctance to
punish these crimes harshly. 138 At the same time, these decisionmakers are less likely to identify with those who commit crimes
against women who are non-intimates. 139 In fact, they may punish
these crimes with special fervor, reserving their chivalrous
responses for circumstances like these. 140
Of course, race and class ideologies intersect with these gender
patterns. Non-intimates who commit violence against women are
perceived as menacing predators, creating imagery that has been
coded by race, class, and gender for centuries. 141 Inflicting harsh
violence.” Id.
137. See Robert J. Smith, Justin D. Levinson, & Zoe Robinson, Implicit White
Favoritism in the Criminal Justice System, 66 ALA. L. REV. 871, 895 (2015) (“At
the core of research on implicit in-group favoritism is the principle that people
automatically associate the in-group or ‘us,’ with positive characteristics, and the
out-group, or ‘them,’ with negative characteristics.”).
138. See id. at 895–96 (reporting results of study that found in-group
favoritism to be an automatic and strong phenomenon).
139. See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 247
(2000) (describing the process by which decision-makers “disempower the group
constructed as ‘other’ in order to empower our group by contrast to ‘them’” and
requiring us to imbue “the ‘others’ with intrinsic, immutable qualities making
them different from us”).
140. See Haney, supra note 83, at 1460–61 (“Human beings react punitively
toward persons whom they regard as defective, foreign, deviant, or fundamentally
different from themselves.”); id. at 1463 (“[F]ew capital jurors will every truly
know—by experience, identification, or intuition—the harsh realities of capital
defendants’ lives.”).
141. The racialized treatment of rape allegations is especially revealing. See
ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 68, at 35 (reporting prior research results
showing that “there has been a systematic, differential practice of imposing the
death penalty on blacks for rape and, most particularly, when the defendants are
black and their victims are white”). Although the death penalty is no longer
available for rape, it is available for rape-murders and inflammatory racial
imagery can infect those trials. See, e.g., PETE EARLEY, CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE: DEATH, LIFE, AND JUSTICE IN A SOUTHERN TOWN (1995) (relaying a
journalist’s account of the capital case of an African-American man falsely
convicted—based on perjured testimony and appeals to prejudice—but later
exonerated of the murder of a young white woman in Monroeville, Alabama, the
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punishment, including death sentences, in situations like these
supports the status quo and its multiple intersecting hierarchies,
allowing chivalrous impulses to be expressed primarily against
poor men, men of color, and other men lacking in social and
material power. 142
Moreover, patriarchal gender norms socialize men to commit
aggressive acts to a far greater extent than women. 143 Our culture
is not so chivalrous as to exclude women from death sentences, but,
when provoked to impose the death penalty, 144 it imposes death
sentences primarily on those understood to be violent aggressors,
who will be disproportionately male. 145 In these circumstances, the
death penalty acts symbolically to annihilate the threat they
pose. 146 Despite the absence of evidence that the death penalty
makes society safer, the cultural choice to use state violence to reassert dominance over those deemed to have perpetrated violence
can be understood in patriarchal terms as well, a response
consistent with socialization into male-defined roles of dominance
and aggression. 147
setting for a similar case in Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird).
142. Because the same degree of opprobrium is not shown for crimes against
family victims, Elizabeth Rapaport notes “the extreme disapprobation which our
society reserves for crimes inflicted on other men’s women and children.”
Elizabeth Rapaport, Some Questions About Gender and the Death Penalty, 20
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 501, 559 (1990).
143. See id. at 510 (“More than ninety-five percent of those convicted of violent
crimes are male.”); see also Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy:
Legal Theory Out of Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1189–90 (1991) (examining
interconnections between forms of subordination, “both the obvious and nonobvious relationships of domination,” and suggesting an explanation of the
racially-motivated murder of a Chinese-American man as not just an expression
of racism, but also of patriarchy, the acculturation of boys into a patriarchal
culture of “dominance and aggression”).
144. See Rapaport, supra note 125, at 367 (noting that although “it is widely
supposed that women murderers are chivalrously spared the death
sentence . . . women are represented on contemporary U.S. death rows in
numbers commensurate with the infrequency of female commission of those
crimes which our society labels sufficiently reprehensible to merit capital
punishment”).
145. See id. at 373 (“Men are demonstrably more prone than women to commit
violent crime.”).
146. See Joan W. Howarth, Review Essay: Feminism, Lawyering, and Death
Row, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 401, 414 (1992) (“The execution is a ritual
by which law-abiding people reclaim power from criminals.”).
147. See id. at 411–20 (arguing that feminists should oppose capital
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Beyond these gender patterns, there are other ways that we
might see patriarchal ideologies as implicated in the crime for
which Joe Giarratano was convicted. A mother and daughter in
Norfolk, Virginia were brutally slaughtered. While there is a
genuine question as to the identity of the perpetrator, the odds are
good that the perpetrator was a person who had been socialized by
1979 into a predominantly male culture of dominant and
aggressive behavior, including its misogynistic expressions. 148
Viewed in this way, it is fair to say that forty-year-old patriarchal
norms played a significant role in the violent tragedy that took two
lives and forcibly re-directed Joe Giarratano’s life into decades of
confinement.
B. Class Ideologies
Class bias is implicated in the Giarratano case in more and
less obvious ways. Like Giarratano, people under death sentence
are, nearly to a person, people lacking in means, an easily
foreseeable consequence of societal decisions to underfund systems
of public defense. 149 Many had poor representation at the trials
punishment because, among other reasons, the death penalty dehumanizes and
objectifies people, and uses the legal system “to convert killing a person into
something lawful . . . the triumph of an idealized version of justice that hides the
racist, classist, messy, freakish, and imperfect reality”). Howarth views these
aspects of capital punishment as incompatible with feminism and, implicitly, as
a product of the dominant, non-feminist, patriarchal world view. This world view
emerges from what sociologist Allan Johnson understands as “patriarchy’s core
motivating force”—“male distrust and fear of other men.” See Becker, supra note
122, at 24 (“Patriarchal culture values ‘control and domination’ most, because
control and domination of other men ensures one’s own safety from them.”).
Supporting this perspective, Robert Burt has compared the death penalty to warmaking, another male-identified institution. See Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the
Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1741, 1764 (1987)
(“Capital punishment is warfare writ small.”).
148. See Becker, supra note 122, at 26–30 (“Although the subjugation of
women is not the central dynamic driving patriarchy, patriarchal culture is
deeply misogynistic and valorizes masculinity. . . . [V]iolence [against women
is] . . . more understandable when one considers how love, need, fear, envy, hate,
and resentment combine in the feelings of many men toward women.”).
149. See Death Penalty Representation, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-representation (last visited Sept.
8, 2016) (“Almost all defendants in capital cases cannot afford their own
attorneys. In many cases, the appointed attorneys are overworked, underpaid, or

1432

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395 (2016)

that resulted in their death sentences. 150 We know that the quality
of representation significantly correlates with the quality of
justice, yet under a system of law we permit the harshest
punishments to be imposed on thousands of people who receive the
compromised form of justice that we make available to those who
cannot pay to defend their lives. 151 Devoting insufficient public
resources to accurate fact-finding and therefore unfairly allocating
the risk of punishment to the poorest people is a virulent form of
class bias. 152
The legal vulnerability that class inequality creates
compounds many other vulnerabilities. While being poor in
America may include being disproportionately subject to
unjustified punishment, even lethal punishment, we also know
that it can include struggling to put food on the table and a roof
overhead for you and your family. 153 Low-income communities
lacking the trial experience required for death penalty cases.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). In Alabama, the state with the highest per
capita rate of executions in the United States, there is no statewide public
defender system, despite the fact that ninety-five percent of death row inmates
are indigent. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SLAMMING THE COURTHOUSE
DOORS: DENIAL OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND REMEDY IN AMERICA 7–8 (2010),
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/HRP_UPRsubmission_annex.pdf.
150. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for
the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 (1994) (“Poor
people accused of capital crimes are often defended by lawyers who lack the skills,
resources, and commitment to handle such serious matters. This fact is confirmed
in case after case.”).
151. The observation that quality of representation correlates with quality of
justice is so readily apparent that it unites commentators across the political
spectrum. Compare id. (“It is not the facts of the crime, but the quality of legal
representation, that distinguishes th[e] case where the death penalty was
imposed, from many similar cases, where it was not.”), and Stevenson, supra note
79, at 97 (“Death sentences are imposed in a criminal justice system that treats
you better if you are rich and guilty than if you are poor and innocent.”), with
Richard A. Posner & Albert H. Yoon, What Judges Think of the Quality of Legal
Representation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 317, 319–21 (2011) (stating that legal outcomes
are influenced by significant disparities in the quality of legal representation).
152. See Stevenson, supra note 79, at 95–96 (“Poverty has become a defining
feature of America’s death penalty system. Support for capital punishment
necessarily means accepting a punishment that is applied unequally and that
largely condemns poor and disfavored defendants who are unable to obtain
adequate legal assistance.”).
153. Because “the United States has greater economic inequality than any
other developed nations . . . a vast array of Americans face systemic restraints
inhibiting or eliminating their chances to be successful.” DOOB, supra note 1, at
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where education and health are poor, where jobs and opportunities
are scarce, and where trauma and substance abuse are high
contain crime-generating conditions, yet other than policing and
punishment, our culture offers little assistance to those who grow
up in these communities and who, by and large, stay in them. 154
Joseph Giarratano experienced these multiple forms of class
bias. Subject to violence and abuse as a child, he received limited
services. 155 When he ran away, authorities repeatedly returned
him to his abusive home. 156 Foreseeably, the traumatized, severely
depressed, and abused child grew into a substance-abusing
adolescent and young adult. 157 The cumulative physiological and
8, 17; see also Robert Rector & Rachel Sheffield, Understanding Poverty in the
United States: Surprising Facts About America’s Poor, HERITAGE FOUND. (Sept.
13, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/09/understandingpoverty-in-the-united-states-surprising-facts-about-americas-poor (last visited
Oct. 4, 2016) (stating that the traditional definition of the word “poor” suggests
“an inability to provide nutritious food, clothing, and reasonable shelter for one’s
family”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Haney understands
the death penalty process as withholding from jurors the role of poverty—its
undermining of parenting that makes poor children vulnerable to depression,
impulsivity, low self-esteem, substance abuse, and delinquency—in the etiology
of crime, resulting in an attribution of the defendant’s violence to his inherent
evil. See Haney, supra note 83, at 1471–73 (“[M]ost habits of violence and
aggressive demeanors are learned defensively—usually in childhood and often in
response to chronically abusive, harmful, or threatening circumstances
defendants certainly did not choose and over which they had no control.”).
154. See, e.g., Kathryne M. Young & Joan Petersilia, Keeping Track:
Surveillance, Control, and the Expansion of the Carceral State, Pulled Over: How
Police Stops Define Race and Citizenship, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1322 (2016)
(Book Review) (observing that the criminal justice system creates a perpetual,
“peripheral” citizenship). Criminal justice system-induced peripheral citizenship
is difficult to escape because, as the authors observe, “the modern criminal justice
apparatus destabilizes lives, particularly those lived in poor and minority
communities.” Id. Consequently, “[i]nstead of helping people gain stability, the
system actually frustrates people’s chances of getting jobs, keeping their housing,
and staying out of trouble.” Id.
155. See 1991 Petition, supra note 87, at 5 (“Social Service authorities
recognized, at least as early as 1973, that his home environment was unhealthy
and some attempts were made to find an alternative home; but Joe always was
returned to his mother’s guardianship.”).
156. See id. (noting that “[a]t an early age, Joe began trying to escape the
horror and shame of the abuse to which he was subjected by running away from
home,” though he was repeatedly returned).
157. See id. (“When running away failed to provide the escape he so
desperately needed, and when authorities consistently returned him to a life of
physical, psychological, and sexual abuse, Joe, at eleven years old, turned to
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psychological effects of living with such struggles, without
protection or assistance, throughout his formative years contribute
to an understanding of how Joe Giarratano became vulnerable to
prosecution for murder, why he reached the doubtful conclusion
that he was responsible for murder, how he found a court system
willing to condemn to death to be a viable route out of the misery
in his life, 158 and why his appointed attorney would stand by and
allow his client to pursue this self-destructive path. 159 Viewed from
drugs, the escape that was most readily available in his home.”).
158.
Without an understanding of the effects of childhood abuse and drug
and alcohol blackouts, most people who have led relatively normal
lives would not understand why a person would assume they did
something as horrible as killing two people and go on to confess to
such a crime. . . Being so convinced, [Giarratano] did everything he
could to convince others [that he should receive a death sentence] or
carry out the job himself [through suicide].
Id. at 11, 14.
159. While Giarratano’s questionable belief in his own guilt and his suicidal
mental state rendered him unable to assist in his defense and incompetent to
stand trial, his court-appointed attorney did little to try to understand
Giarratano’s situation, background, psychological state, or even the facts of the
case—information germane to the sentencing phase as well as the guilt-innocence
phase. Id. at 69. Instead, “his attorney simply assumed that Mr. Giarratano was
guilty, just as did everyone else.” Id. at 64. This assumption, and the likely
awareness that Giarratano wanted to die, prevented the attorney from
performing rudimentary aspects of his role, such as conducting fact investigation
or impeaching a police officer who testified that Giarratano confessed to raping
Michelle Kline, even though the officer’s written, contemporaneous record of
Giarratano’s statement contained no such admission. Id. at 44–45. This is a key
piece of testimony, as the rape made the murder of Michelle death-eligible under
Virginia’s statute. See Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 266 S.E.2d 94, 99 (Va. 1980)
(upholding Girratano’s conviction for capital murder under the statutory
provision that authorizes a capital sentence for the “willful, deliberate and
premeditated killing of a person during the commission of, or subsequent to,
rape”).
Imagine how different Giarratano’s trial might have been if his attorney had
created the kind of trusting relationship with his client that Marie Deans was
subsequently able to form. See infra note 178 and accompanying text (describing
the Giarratano-Deans relationship). While our system does not facilitate courtappointed attorneys devoting themselves to such a degree to a single client, in a
case like this one a greater measure of individualized attention was part of the
attorney’s duty of representation. See, e.g., James M. Doyle, The Lawyers’ Art:
‘Representation’ in Capital Cases, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 417, 426 (1996)
(observing the “consensus among accomplished death-penalty lawyers” that they
should “collect all of the information—school records, medical history, family
memories, the defendant’s own accounts—that bear on the defendant’s humanity”
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this perspective, the Giarratano case illustrates how, in our society
and its legal system, class strata matter in a profound material
way.
C. Interlocking Ideologies
The overlap between class subordination and race
subordination is dramatic. 160 The reasons that racial minorities,
and especially African-Americans, are overrepresented among the
poor are not accidental but structural. 161 Among the multiple
brutalities and deprivations imposed by race-based chattel slavery
was the deprivation of African-Americans’ access to a livelihood. 162
The century after slavery’s end saw the emergence of multiple
obstacles for African-Americans, including markedly unequal

then “present this information in as compelling a form as possible”).
160. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 79, at 94 (“Racial minorities in the United
States are also disproportionately poor. Poverty and economic disadvantage
among people of color increase the risk of wrongful or unfair treatment in the
criminal justice system.”); see also DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM: HOW
EVERYDAY CHOICES LOCK IN WHITE ADVANTAGE 11 (2014):
[I]ssues of class are in the US issues of race. This is true particularly
when it comes to the poorest of the poor. . . . Owing to discrimination,
those families who can afford to pass down wealth for college
educations and housing down payments tend to be disproportionately
white. The same goes for networks that are able to refer high paying
jobs in lucrative occupations. Set against the backdrop of Jim Crow and
slavery, institutional feedback loops reproduce racial disparity. . . .
161. See Douglas S. Massey, American Apartheid: Segregation and the
Making of the Underclass, 96 AM. J. SOC. 329, 345 (1990) (using data to
demonstrate that racial segregation in housing plays a key role in concentrating
poverty and creating an urban underclass, because “[r]acial segregation takes the
overall loss in black income, concentrates it spatially, and focuses it on fragile
neighborhoods that are the least able to absorb it”); see also ROITHMAYR, supra
note 160, at 4–10 (arguing that racial inequality persists because early white
advantage leads to continuing advantage, maintaining a “self-reinforcing system
of distribution of resources and opportunities . . . built on the foundations of
slavery and Jim Crow”).
162. See Rogers M. Smith, “One United People”: Second-Class Female
Citizenship and the American Quest for Community, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 229,
257 (1989) (arguing that the ideology underlying the Constitution’s three postwar amendments was “the central importance of free labor as the source of all
productive value” and that “every human being had a natural right to pursue his
trade and reap the fruits of his labor,” making slavery “the height of injustice”).
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access to education, jobs, housing, and health care. 163 These
conditions compounded the racialized uses of law enforcement and
ensnared many African-Americans in criminal justice processes. 164
In turn, criminal sanctions produced further obstacles, as the
disabilities that accompanied them reduced the prospect for
material subsistence and opportunity. 165 Such potent and
interactive structural combinations preserved racial hierarchy by
stifling the economic progress and life’s chances of AfricanAmericans.
While European immigrants came to colonial America for
economic opportunity, African people were forcibly brought to
America to promote the economic advance of EuropeanAmericans. 166 Extending from these early mutually reinforcing
structures of race, power, and wealth, economic dependency and
exploitation became persistent features of America’s structures of
163. See ROITHMAYR, supra note 160, at 4–10 (explaining the continuous
reproduction of racial hierarchy through the cartel-like conduct of white
majorities in the allocation of economic opportunities such as housing, jobs, and
education); ALEXANDER, supra note 22, at 35 (“By the turn of the twentieth
century, every state in the South had laws . . . that disenfranchised blacks and
discriminated . . . in virtually every sphere of life, lending sanction to a racial
ostracism that extended to schools, churches, housing, jobs, restrooms, hotels,
restaurants, hospitals, orphanages, prisons, funeral homes, morgues, and
cemeteries.”); see also BAPTIST, supra note 24, at xvi (“In non-Confederate states,
many restaurants wouldn’t serve black customers. Stores and factories refused to
hire African Americans. Hundreds of Midwestern communities forcibly evicted
African-American residents . . . .”).
164. When the civil rights era abolished formal segregation, Alexander argues
that a nationwide law and order movement focused on African-Americans
replaced segregation as the mechanism for maintaining racial hierarchy.
ALEXANDER, supra note 22, at 35–40.
165. See id. at 1–2 (“Once you’re labeled a felon, the old forms of
discrimination—employment discrimination, housing discrimination, denial of
the right to vote, denial of educational opportunity, denial of food stamps and
other public benefits, and exclusion from jury service—are suddenly legal.”); see
also DONALD BRAMAN, DOING TIME ON THE OUTSIDE: INCARCERATION AND FAMILY
LIFE IN URBAN AMERICA 174 (2004) (finding that the inability of released prisoners
“to earn a decent living and support a family was far more shameful than their
criminality”). According to Braman, “the stigma of criminality leads to the shame
of being unable to support one's children, to help one’s mother, and so forth.” Id.
166. See BAPTIST, supra note 24, at xxi–xxii (arguing that returns from the
cotton monopoly power enabled by slavery drove American economic expansion,
modernization, and industrialization, such that it is accurate to say “the
commodification and suffering and forced labor of African Americans is what
made the United States powerful and rich”).
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racial difference, interacting with racialized allocation of failing
schools, predatory business practices, limited employment, and the
devastating lifelong consequences of criminal convictions. 167
America might well have waged a more effective war on poverty if
it were not simultaneously a war on race subordination, if poverty
alleviation could have been accomplished without undermining the
structures that for centuries have supported a system of racial
caste. 168
If structures of race make Americans less interested in
eliminating structures of poverty, then race is a discernible part of
the reason that capital defendants have inadequate lawyers at
trial, part of the reason that our society has not supported a
higher-functioning criminal justice system, and even part of the
reason that so few social services are available to people like Joe
Giarratano, whose life might have been transformed far earlier if
services had been available to him when he had urgent needs for
help. In an indirect yet meaningful way, the interlocking realities
of race and class stratification in America can be viewed as playing
a significant role in the tragically converging situations that led to
Joe Giarratano’s conviction.

167.
[W]ith high rates of poverty come a variety of other social and
economic conditions: reduced buying power, increased welfare
dependence, high rates of family disruption, elevated crime rates,
housing deterioration, elevated infant mortality rates, and decreased
educational quality. These outcomes, moreover, do not occur in
isolation but represent a set of mutually reinforcing conditions. Thus,
the increase in poverty concentration that follows automatically when
the minority poverty rate rises in a segregated city brings about a
constellation of other changes in the social and economic composition
of neighborhoods that have profound implications for the well-being
of those who live there.
Massey, supra note 161, at 342.
168. Alleviating poverty would significantly alter America’s status quo racial
hierarchy, because the racial wealth gap remains “staggeringly large,” though it
traces to Jim Crow and slavery. See ROITHMAYR, supra note 160, at 62 (citing
economic data showing that “the dramatic wealth differences at emancipation—
when black former slave families began with zero net worth—and the impact of
segregated schooling likely explain the majority of modern wealth differences”).
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IV. What’s Lost and What’s Learned

Learning about the sterling qualities of intellect 169 and
altruism 170 that Joe Giarratano exhibits today, we cannot help but
wonder why, as a culture, we are willing to sacrifice so many who
are capable of so much. 171 What lessons do we derive from the
wrenching Gothic story that resulted in Giarratano’s decades of
incarceration? Do social stratification and structures of
subordination prevent us from experiencing our connection to
children living in scarring conditions like those that Giarratano
endured? Why do we let fester the conditions that lead to crime
and then regard the crime as nothing more than a voluntary act of
individual responsibility? The need to maintain race, gender, and
class hierarchies begins an explanation of what is otherwise
inexplicable and disfiguring.
169. See 2009 Petition, supra note 115, at 9 (“On death row, Joe became a
voracious reader, studying philosophy, American history . . . [,] and peaceful
conflict resolution. Joe educated himself to an extent that many never
achieve . . . began to study the law, and learned that he possessed a hidden talent,
despite his almost complete lack of any formal education.”). Giarratano’s law
review article considering the importance of appellate remedies in capital cases
was published in the Yale Law Journal. See generally Joseph M. Giarratano, “To
the Best of Our Knowledge, We Have Never Been Wrong”: Fallibility vs. Finality
in Capital Punishment, 100 YALE L.J. 1005 (1991).
170. See 2009 Petition, supra note 124, at 9–10 (describing Joe’s work as a
jailhouse lawyer, filing motions, petitions, and stays of execution on behalf of
dozens of Virginia inmates who had no lawyers, including Earl Washington, later
exonerated by DNA evidence, who would have been executed but for Giarratano’s
legal intervention on his behalf); id. at 10–11 (describing Giarratano’s assistance
to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in challenging inhumane prison
conditions, and his creation of an inmate-led peace studies and alternatives to
violence program). Professor Jack Boger describes Giarratano as “unfailingly
thoughtful, courteous, honorable, deeply concerned about others,” observing that
Giarratano “has worried more about, and has done more for, his fellow inmates
on Virginia’s death row—many of them illiterate and confused about their
plight—than have their prison counselors and attorneys.” Id. at 46.
171. Giarratano’s transformation is described as “a testament to the power of
the positive force of the human spirit.” Id. at 1. Professor Michael Milleman
writes, “In another lifetime, with the most modest family support that we all take
for granted, Joe Giarratano would have been a brilliant lawyer.” Id. at 46; see also
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS
409 (2001) (“We are to acknowledge that life’s miseries strike deep, striking to the
heart of human agency itself. And yet we are also to insist that they do not remove
humanity, that the capacity for goodness remains when all else has been
removed.”).
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Many people’s acts were involved in creating the situation of
defendants like Joe Giarratano, including the acts of turning deaf
ears toward defendants’ needs. 172 Recognizing this collective role,
the caricature of a crime as an act of individual free will by a
defendant who is an enemy of the community begins to unravel. 173
Instead, the defendant can be seen as the offspring of the
community. 174
172. Some argue that individual behavior should be understood as collectively
produced. See generally John Hospers, What Means This Freedom?, in FREE WILL
AND DETERMINISM 26 (Bernard Berofsky ed., 1966). Craig Haney argues that the
individualist ideology of criminal behavior found a strong foothold after the
widespread poverty that economic transformations of the nineteenth century
produced, because its accompanying concerns about social control of economic and
property crime led the middle and upper classes to view crime as contained in the
character of the lower classes, “thereby justifying their punitive segregation.” See
Craig Haney, Criminal Justice and the Nineteenth-Century Paradigm: The
Triumph of Psychological Individualism in the ‘Formative Era’, 6 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 191, 198 (1982) [hereinafter Haney, The Nineteenth-Century Paradigm]
(“Urbanization and industrialization had created increasing numbers of alienated
and dislocated poor who were more likely to commit economic crime. At the same
time, there now existed a propertied class with a growing desire to be protected
from the poor.”). Therefore, Haney sees the individualist view as sociohistorically
contingent, and anachronistic, although “it has continued to serve as the core
behavioral assumption of American criminal law.” Id. at 229–30; see also Craig
Haney, Condemning the Other in Death Penalty Trials: Biographical Racism,
Structural Mitigation, and the Empathic Divide, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1557, 1564
(2004) (“[E]xposure to violent, abusive parenting is criminogenic.” (emphasis
added)).
173. Richard Boldt has examined the ideological function of ascribing free will
to individuals through criminal justice blaming practices that “submerg[e] the
causal roots of conduct . . . .” Richard C. Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility
in the Criminal Law, 140 U. PENN. L. REV. 2245, 2253 (1992); see also Robin West,
Narrative, Responsibility, and Death: A Comment on the Death Penalty Cases
from the 1989 Term, 1 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 161, 175 (1990) (arguing
that talking exclusively about rights and neglecting narratives undermines the
“opportunity to construct an alternative understanding of societal responsibility
for criminality that might challenge the unbridled individualism of the narrative
account provided by the conservative majority”).
174. See Haney, The Nineteenth-Century Paradigm, supra note 172, at 228
(“[A] person is a personality because he belongs to a community . . . .” (quoting
GEORGE HERBERT MEAD, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GEORGE HERBERT MEAD 239
(1956))); see also id. (“[T]he interdependence of the individual personality with
the institutional structure of society [is] destroying the one-way notion of social
causation and criticizing its underlying individualism” (quoting RICHARD
HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 159 (1955))). According to
Haney, these “powerful competing perspectives” emphasize “the social and
cultural determinants of behavior.” Id. at 227–29.
In another criminal justice context, James Doyle observes the role of collective
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Though it is considered anathema to American criminal
justice, communal responsibility for conditions that generate crime
is an idea found in many sources. 175 Some feminist philosophies
articulate it, some of them grounding the perspective in women’s
traditional role as caretakers of dependents and extending the
perspective into social and political life. 176 Joe Giarratano’s life
gives us reason to reconsider our culture’s thorough rejection of a
communal responsibility perspective.
Freed from the addictions that numbed the pain of a childhood
of abuse, 177 enabled by relationships with extraordinary people
decisions in individual choices about involvement in illegal drug activity:
A claim that [inner city] residents bear no responsibility for the drug
epidemic that plagues their communities would be ridiculous, but can
it possibly be true that the larger society bears no
responsibility? . . . The [inner city] has no goods or services, or at least
so few that the decision to traffic in drugs is an economically rational
(even if morally unattractive) decision. The economic conditions that
have given rise to that situation cannot be entirely a product of the
[inner city] itself. The drugs are not grown, or refined, or even, for the
most part, wholesaled in the [inner city]. Nevertheless, larger society
tends to assume that the [inner city] residents, so distant and different,
have created the drug epidemic for themselves.
James M. Doyle, Into the Eight Ball: The Colonialists’ Landscape in American
Criminal Justice, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 65, 93 (1992).
175. See also CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE,
POVERTY, AND THE UNDERCLASS 22, 203 (1992) (urging concrete policies based on
an understanding of the dynamic between individual responsibility and societal
obligations “to distribute our material goods and services more equally” and to
“reduce poverty, joblessness, illiteracy, violence, or despair” by changing “our
institutions and attitudes in hundreds of small ways”); Sharon Beckman, Can
Criminal Punishment Survive Christian Scrutiny?: A Comment on Jeffrey
Murphy’s ‘Christianity and Criminal Punishment’, in 6 PUNISHMENT & SOCIETY,
no. 1, 2004, at 87, 88, 93 (arguing that Christian principles would preclude “harsh,
condemnatory, and stigmatizing” criminal punishments that follow from “our
widespread toleration of intolerable conditions,” our disregard of “disparate
impact on people of color and the poor,” and “our failure to explore less destructive
ways of promoting public well being. . . .”). See generally Mead, supra note 174;
Hofstadter, supra note 174; NICOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL
PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY VALUES (1988) (critiquing individual culpability as a
basis for criminal punishment and grounding justifications for punishment in
communitarian political theory).
176. See generally NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A RELATIONAL APPROACH TO ETHICS
AND MORAL EDUCATION (2d ed. 2013); OLENA HANKIVSKY, SOCIAL POLICY AND THE
ETHIC OF CARE (2004); ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE (1997); ALLISON M.
JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE (1983).
177. Giarratano’s mother physically abused him, leading him to use drugs
and alcohol—readily available in his home—at such an early age that by the time
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like Marie Deans, 178 exposed to important philosophical thinkers
through the books that he read in the solitude of his cell, 179 Joe
Giarratano gained access to his ability and his humanity. 180 He has
been cultivating them ever since, through reading,
communicating, peacemaking, writing letters, writing blogs,
writing briefs, and helping fellow inmates craft pro se legal claims
that their lawyers might file if only they had lawyers. 181
he was twenty-one, a medical examination found that his liver was already
permanently damaged. See 2009 Petition, supra note 124, at 2–3 (describing the
abuse that Giarratano suffered as a child). Ironically, his life changed when he
came to death row: “On death row he purged himself of the alcohol and hard
drugs . . . . When the fog cleared, another person seemed to emerge.” Maryanne
Vollers, As His Date with the Executioner Nears, Joe Giarratano Says He’s No
Killer—and Some People Believe Him, PEOPLE (May 28, 1990),
http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20117758,00.html (last visited
Sept. 8, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
178. At the time Marie Deans met Giarratano, she was the executive director
of the Virginia Coalition on Jails and Prisons. She also had been the founder of
Murder Victims Families for Reconciliation. When they met, Giarratano was on
anti-psychotic medication and was seeking to waive his appeals to hasten his
execution. Deans persuaded Giarratano that his own life was worth saving and
that he should pursue appellate remedies. She also uncovered evidence that cast
doubt on the reliability of Giarratano’s confessions and raised the possibility of
his innocence. See 2009 Petition, supra note 124, at 5–7 (identifying problems
with the evidence supporting the theory that Giarratano murdered Barbara and
Michelle Kline). Giarratano credits Deans with restoring his will to live and to
take his appeals rather than submit to execution: “She told me I wasn’t a monster.
I was a human being, and she cared about me. Nobody had ever told me things
like that before.” Vollers, supra note 177.
179. See Vollers, supra note 177 (“Although Giarratano had never before
finished a book, the shelf in his cell began to accumulate well-thumbed works of
Aristotle, Gandhi, and Goethe.”); see also 1991 Petition, supra note 87, at 20
(“When Joe is not doing legal work, he is reading or writing. He is a student of
Tocqueville, Locke, Jefferson, Hume and the American Constitution, which he
knows, understands and loves as few Americans do. He is also a student of
theology . . . Dostoevsky, Faulkner, Camus and Pirsig.”).
180. Giarratano has been described as having an “agile intelligence,” “hunger
for learning,” “basic decency,” and “concern for others around him.” See 2009
Petition, supra note 124, at 68 (identifying traits Giarratano exhibits that make
an impression on those who meet him). Martha Geer, an attorney for the law firm
that filed in the U.S. Supreme Court the case of Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S.
1 (1989), wrote that Giarratano “critiqued our papers and our arguments with a
sophistication that I cannot explain—I have no idea where it comes from given
his educational and cultural background . . . . He got nothing out of this. All of the
effort was on behalf of others and on behalf of the principle of fairness.” Id. at 57.
181. See Colman McCarthy, Death Row Certainties, WASH. POST (June 11,
1989) (“[Giarratano] has lived 10 years in . . . a cage with the prospect of death as
the sole release—and yet his discussion of justice, nonviolence and human rights
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Joseph Giarratano’s transformation reveals to us the
extraordinary cost of our social, political, and legal structures of
subordination. His continued incarceration, even after he has
become parole eligible and reasonable doubt of innocence has been
documented, compels us to find other approaches. 182 Were it not
for the distortions introduced by race, gender, and class ideologies,
the tragedies of his life might have been altered, and his treatment
by the criminal justice system might have been more attentive and
accurate. 183 At the same time, released from imagined
is as lucid as any I have heard. I have read some of his writings. They, too, are
reflective and reasoned.”). As for Giarratano’s legal work, McCarthy writes:
“Among his successful appeals is one that gives Virginia prisoners the right to
receive visits from reporters, phone calls from lawyers, and confidential mail.” Id.
Giarratano’s most well-known legal work is the civil case that he prepared for
his co-plaintiff Earl Washington, an illiterate, mildly retarded inmate facing
execution without a lawyer for his state habeas corpus proceedings. Although
both the U.S. District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
sitting en banc, upheld Giarratano’s theory that the constitutional right to
meaningful access to the courts required that indigent death row inmates receive
court-appointed lawyers for state post-conviction proceedings, the U.S. Supreme
Court in Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989), ultimately reversed in a
plurality opinion. Nonetheless, Virginia and many other states subsequently
enacted a law requiring the appointment of state post-conviction counsel in these
circumstances. See Eric M. Freedman, Giarratano Is a Scarecrow: The Right to
Counsel in State Post-Conviction Proceedings, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1079, 1086 n.45
(2006) (observing that thirty-three of thirty-seven death penalty states now
recognize a right to counsel for state post-conviction proceedings). And thanks to
Giarratano—and a number of others who subsequently intervened—Washington
lived long enough to be exonerated. Eric M. Freedman, Symposium, Earl
Washington’s Ordeal, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1089, 1103 (2001).
182. Paradoxically, due to the emphasis in parole hearings on acceptance of
responsibility and remorse, Giarratano’s assertion of innocence makes him less
likely to be granted parole. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner’s
Dilemma: Consequences of Failing to Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings, 93 IOWA L.
REV. 491, 493 (2008) (“[A]dmitting guilt increases the likelihood of a favorable
parole outcome for an inmate whereas proclaiming innocence serves to diminish
the chance for release.”). Consequently, Giarratano has been denied parole on
multiple occasions. See, e.g., 2009 Petition, supra note 124, at 87 (noting that
Giarratano was denied parole in 2004 and 2007). Based on this record, the
petition sought a conditional pardon for Giarratano, because “the stark and
unjust reality is that he very likely is never going to be paroled . . . . Parole for
Joe is an illusory hope despite the weighty, compelling, and longstanding record
he has amassed that demonstrates he is deserving of immediate release.” Id. at
86, 92.
183. See Haney, supra note 83, at 1450 (“[A] vast and elaborate system outside
the courtroom, founded on misconception, supports the existence, operation, and
increased popularity of the death penalty.”).
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constructions of race, gender, and class, our culture would be safer,
fairer, and more reflective of our collective humanity.

